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ABSTRACT
The dissertation focuses on the study of environmental policies and their impacts on the power
systems’ planning. It consists of three parts, each of which addresses a single problem on environmental
policies and generation expansion planning. In the first part of the dissertation, I compared the cap-
and-trade policy and various carbon tax policies in a single period under the generation expansion
framework. The problem was modeled as a bilevel problem where the lower level competing generation
companies maximized their own profits under the regulations of the upper level. The policies were
compared via their effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness referred to a policy’s capability to control
the amount of carbon emissions, and efficiency was measured with respect to five criteria: emissions
price, renewable energy portfolio, total generation, total profit of generation companies and grid owner,
and government revenue. In the second part, the model was extended to multi-period planning to gain
better views into market dynamics. Cap-and-trade and four variations of carbon tax policies were
integrated in a game-theory based generation expansion planning model to assess their impacts on
new investments in renewable energy generation capacity. The most efficient tax policy and variations
were obtained using inverse equilibrium models. The third part complemented the previous parts by
conducting a realistic case study on the generation expansion planning under uncertainty. It studied the
formulation and solution of investment decisions in new generation under the explicit representation of
environmental policies and their associated uncertainty. A three-layer framework was proposed to study
the investment decisions. The operations layer was used to represent the transmission physical flows
under economic dispatch in the network; the assessment layer completed comprehensive assessment
of candidate investment plans under uncertainty; the optimization layer was designed to compare the
optimal investment decisions for the decision makers based on the optimization criteria. Our framework
was tested on a realistic 240-bus WECC network, taking into account representative scenarios and
investment plans.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Background
If modern society is analogized as a human body, electricity can be compared with the blood that
drives the operations of people’s daily activities. It pumps from the large arteries such as refinery, to the
the small capillaries such as cooking and farming. It is therefore of crucial importance to supply reliable
and uninterrupted electricity. However, population growth and technological advancement have pushed
power consumption to an unprecedented level, and the decision-making on future grid infrastructures
must deal with problems and challenges inherent in generation expansion planning – a process for
investors to seek strategies to build new generators in power systems.
First, market liberalization adds complexity to model market players interactions by introducing
competitions among market players. Since the 1990s, power systems were changed from a vertically
integrated structure, in which generation, transmission and distribution were all owned and regulated
by a single system operator, to a decentralized structure, in which generation companies, transmission
companies, distribution companies, load serving entities and individual consumers can make their own
optimization decisions monitored by Independent System Operators [54]. The deregulated structure
introduces competition among private entities in the energy markets. Game theory is widely applied
to model the restructured power systems and characterize interactions among market players. When
the models are not computationally tractable, simulations and/or heuristic methodologies are needed to
obtain approximate outcomes.
Second, numerous environmental regulations have emerged and been imposed on the power sys-
tems. Electricity in current power systems is mainly generated from coal-fire generators. Coal, which
requires millions years to form, will be depleted in the next century. Coal-fired generators also emit
greenhouse gas, which is believed to be the main culprit for global warming. For the sake of future
2generations, current power systems have to be overhauled to create one that is both cleaner and more
sustainable. However, generators which use renewable resources entail a large investment capital in
large tracts of land for installation. For this reason renewable generators are unlikely to attract profit-
seeking investors under the current economic model. Thus, environmental policies are proposed to
restrict the pollutant emissions or require a minimum supply come from renewable resources, which
will stimulate plentiful investments in renewable generators. Many associated programs have been im-
plemented to incentivize renewable generator investments and promote participation in energy saving
programs from the electricity end users. Thus, the implementation of environmental regulations plays
an important role in generation expansion planning by introducing new constraints and mechanisms on
the future grid.
Third, the decision-making process is difficult to formulate under the current uncertainty surround-
ing the energy market. Fuel prices, demand fluctuations and outages of operating elements were once
the most popular discussed uncertainty sources in the operations and planning of the power systems.
However, with penetration of renewable resources, renewable generation intermittency becomes a new
significant source of uncertainty. If not carefully schemed, it might cause reliability issues and reduce
generator efficiency. Renewable outputs are correlated spatially, and to electricity loads, which makes
the modeling and simulation of the power systems tremendously complicated. Consideration of uncer-
tainty makes depiction of the power system’s decision-making more accurate.
To meet the growing demand and comply with environmental regulations, generation expansion is
required to maintain the adequacy and reliability of power systems . Insightful knowledge of complex
strategic behavior among market entities can support the oligopoly to exercise their powers toward better
profitability in the liberalized energy market. A robust investment decision must take into account the
challenges which arise future grids too, such as potential implementations of a myriad of regulations
and their associated uncertainty.
1.2 Problem Introduction
In my dissertation, I studied the power systems’ planning under environmental regulations by in-
vestigating the characteristics and impacts of the environmental policies in single-and multiple-period
3generation expansion planning. Based on a novel framework, I also conducted a comprehensive case
study using a realistic test system to assess an independent generation company’s investment plans
under uncertainty from regulations, other market players, future loads and renewable resources. The
following three sections are brief introductions to three papers in the dissertation.
1.2.1 Introduction to Comparison of Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Taxes
The carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies are two types of environmental policies that differ in
approach, but have the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote renewable energy. In
both policies there is a cost associated with emissions created during energy generation. In the carbon
tax policy, the emission price is predetermined, but the total actual emissions are determined by the
market. In cap-and-trade policy, the total emissions are capped, but the emission price is determined
by the market. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), started in 2008, was the first carbon
dioxide cap-and-trade program [51]. The carbon tax has not been formally and widely implemented in
the U.S yet. However, it has been widely applied in some countries like New Zealand and Switzerland.
The carbon tax is considered one of the possible future environmental regulations in the U.S. Currently
there is very little in the literature that gives insight on the economic impacts of the carbon tax policy
on the power systems. Moreover, it is unclear whether the carbon tax would be more beneficial in
the power systems than existing regulations such as the cap-and-trade policy. It is very meaningful to
compare the carbon tax policy with existing emission reduction policy to provide economic insights for
future implementation.
In the first part of the dissertation, the model in [47] was extended to address the comparison be-
tween various carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies. Game theory models were used to integrate the
environmental policies in a generation expansion planning framework. We compared the efficiency and
effectiveness of these policies in the context of generation capacity expansion.
1.2.2 Introduction to Multi-Period Carbon Policies
In the the first segment, only a single period operation or planning was considered on a small
network. The results were insufficient to illustrate the dynamics of the impacts from environmental
policies on the power systems. Moreover, the example was too small to capture the complex interactions
4of real power systems. Therefore, in the second part, the model was further extended to consider multi-
period planning to capture the market dynamics, and practically modeled two interdependent markets
– energy and emissions markets. The periods were interconnected owing to the generator construction
lead time. More details of the energy and emission markets were added. The formulation describes how
the generation companies made decisions when they perceived the future dynamic carbon prices, and
how the policies were determined when the regulator observed the long-term expansion strategies of
generation companies. An IEEE 30-bus network was applied in this case study to reflect the complexity
of the power system network.
1.2.3 Introduction to Assessment of Generation Expansion Planning
In previous works, we highlighted the comparison between various carbon tax and cap-and-trade
policies. Generation expansion planning was not emphasized, and it only served as a way to comply
with the environmental regulations. As a complement, the last paper studied the formulation and solu-
tion of investment decisions in new generations under explicit representation of environmental policies
and associated uncertainty to gains insights into feasibility, effectiveness and robustness of investment
strategies under a myriad of uncertainty sources. The proposed framework was applied to investigate
the impacts of two categorizations of uncertainty – epistemic (systematic) and aleatoric (statistical)
uncertainty on investment strategies. Uncertainty from renewable generation outputs and loads was
modeled as aleatoric uncertainty, while uncertainty from governments, regulators and market players
was modeled as epistemic uncertainty. The framework was tested in a realistic 240-bus system. The
investment strategies were compared via various optimization criteria and assessed through assessment
indicators comprehensively. Possible suggestions were presented to help the decision makers modify
the existing plans.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
The dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper, published in Handbook of CO2 in Power
Systems[45], appears in Chapter 2. The second paper, published in Computers & Industrial Engineer-
ing[44], is presented in Chapter 3. The third paper, in preparation for submission to IEEE Transactions
5on Power Systems Special Section on “Power System Planning and Operation towards a Low-Carbon
Economy”, is included in Chapter 4. Concluding remarks in Chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation.
6CHAPTER 2. COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAP-AND-TRADE AND
CARBON TAXES POLICIES IN GENERATION EXPANSION PLANNING
Published in Handbook of CO2 in Power Systems
Yanyi He, Lizhi Wang and Jianhui Wang
ABSTRACT
Cap-and-trade and carbon taxes are two types of environmental policies that differ in their goals
and approaches but both have the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote renew-
able energy. We compare the effectiveness and efficiency of theses policies in the context of generation
capacity expansion. Game theoretic models are used to integrate the environmental policies in a genera-
tion expansion planning framework. The most efficient tax policies and variations are obtained using the
inverse equilibrium models. We compare cap-and-trade and carbon taxes with respect to five criteria:
carbon price and tax, renewable energy portfolio, total energy generation, generation companies’ and
grid owner’s total profit, and government revenue. Numerical experiments show the relative advantages,
disadvantages, similarities, differences and limitations of the he policies.
2.1 Introduction
With increasing concerns on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are a major contrib-
utor of global warming, renewable energy has been identified as a key solution to a sustainable future
of energy supplies. Compared to the mature non-renewable generation technologies, one of the major
disadvantages of renewable energy is the capital-intensive construction and manufacturing. In an effort
to offset such disadvantages, environmental policies at the federal and regional levels have been playing
an important role in promoting renewable energy for decades. According to the Energy Information
Administration [5], renewable energy subsidies in the U.S. increased from $1.4 billion to $4.9 billion
7between 1999 and 2007. The results of the subsidies were mixed: electricity production from wind in-
creased at a yearly rate of 32%, but the production of all other renewable energy sources (hydroelectric,
biomass, geothermal, and solar) failed to increase continuously or significantly during that period.
There are mainly three types of environmental policies: market (such as cap-and-trade), incentive
(such as carbon taxes and production tax credits), and mandate (such as renewable energy portfolio).
Although they all have the overall effect of promoting renewable energy, they differ in specific policy
goals and approaches, which also result in varying effectiveness. The cap-and-trade policy, for exam-
ple, aims at reducing GHG emissions by setting an upper bound, or cap, of the total emissions from
a power supplier. Initial amounts of emissions allowances are allocated to individual power suppliers,
who can trade their allowances between them but the overall cap will not be exceeded. This policy does
not directly penalize non-renewable energy or subsidize renewable energy, but focuses on controlling
the total emissions as a system output. A market for trading emissions allowances is formed to set
the carbon price, which determines only the revenue redistribution among power suppliers rather than
revenues from or expenses to external sources. An alternative policy that also receives great attentions
and discussions is carbon taxes, which are imposed on all emissions from electricity generation. This
chapter contributes to the debates on the comparison of these policies from the following perspectives.
First, the comparison of effectiveness is under the context of generation expansion planning (GEP).
This is motivated by the fact that once installed, the marginal cost of renewable generation is usually
much lower than non-renewable one; but the major obstacle is that the prohibitive capital investment
requirements limit new renewable capacity installment in the first place. The effectiveness of the poli-
cies should therefore be evaluated in terms of their capability to stimulate new investment in renewable
energy. We also land our analysis of the generation expansion planning problem on the restructured
electricity market, which has lead to major changes to the traditional generation expansion planning
in the electricity industry [72]. The unbundling of generation and transmission make the generation
expansion planning much more competitive for self-interested independent participants in electricity
markets. In an old vertically-integrated electricity market, the investment in new generation resources
was centrally planned in order to achieve a pre-specified system reliability level, and the cost was cov-
8ered by ratepayers [23, 25, 77]. In a restructured electricity market, however, each generation company
(GENCO) can pursue its own maximized profit by strategically investing in and operating its generating
units. A non-arbitrage bilateral market equilibrium model presented in [47] is used for this analysis.
This model not only captures the major factors of interest but also has the nice property of possessing a
unique solution, thus provides a good basis for our extended analysis of generation expansion planning
under environmental policies.
Second, we propose a novel inverse equilibrium model to determine the optimal carbon taxes. For
a given overall emissions cap, the modeling of the cap-and-trade policy is relatively straightforward.
However, there could exist multiple and different tax policies that can all achieve the same policy goal.
For comparison with cap-and-trade, it is only fair and meaningful to use the most effective tax policy.
The inverse equilibrium model we present enables us to determine such optimal tax policy that makes
our comparison more meaningful. The carbon taxes policies we consider in our models are more general
than just taxes; we consider taxes, subsidies (representing production tax credits), as well as variations
of their combinations.
Third, the comparisons between cap-and-trade and carbon taxes are based on five criteria: carbon
price and subsidy, renewable energy portfolio, total energy generation, GENCOs’ and grid owner’s to-
tal profit, and government revenue. Our intention is not to declare a winner or loser, but to provide a
modeling tool and framework to analyze their advantages, disadvantages, similarities, differences, and
limitations from objective and meaningful perspectives.
Environmental policies in electricity market has been a topic of numerous studies. Game theoretic
models are used to analyze the equilibria with NOx limits [31, 32]. A case study of the State of Mary-
land is conducted in [70] to investigate the economic and energy impacts from participation in a regional
cap-and-trade system. Johnson [53] discusses the subsidies, carbon taxes and cap and trade. The au-
thor finds that new-source subsidies will accelerate the de-carbonization of the electricity generation. A
comprehensive discussion of key technical challenges for the power industry in face of climate change
is provided in [22]. Tabors et al. [73] analyze the impact of different policies including carbon taxes
9for the U.S. electric industry to reduce both acid rain production and global warming gases. A CO2
cap-and-trade system is modeled in [82] to simulate the energy production of some regions in the U.S.
However, this research does not consider the long-term generation expansion issues in sufficient details.
There also exist various models for analyzing market power exercise and GEP in an electricity mar-
ket. Game theoretic models [33, 57, 59] are particularly suitable to capture the oligopolistic nature of
GENCOs in an electricity market. Wang [79] presents a generation expansion planning model with
uncertain demands and generator availabilities. Coalition and collusion of participants in electricity
markets are studied using a cooperative game approach in [20, 41]. A non-cooperative incomplete in-
formation game approach is applied in [40] to model GENCOs’ optimal bidding strategy within a set
of discrete bids.
2.2 Models
In this section, we introduce the energy market models that we use to analyze and compare cap-
and-trade and carbon taxes policies. Section 2.2.1 lists the nomenclature used in this chapter. Section
2.2.2 summarizes the non-arbitrage bilateral market equilibrium model presented in [47]. This model
provides a basis for our analysis of generation capacity expansion under environmental policies. Section
2.2.3 extends the bilateral market equilibrium model to include GEP, in which individual GENCOs
choose the quantity and type (renewable or non-renewable) of new generation installment to compete for
maximum profits in a Nash-Cournot manner. The resulting Nash equilibrium is a linear complimentarity
problem (LCP). Section 2.2.3 incorporates the carbon cap-and-trade policy into the GEP model. By
regulating carbon emissions and prices, the regulator intends to encourage more investment in new
renewable generation capacity. Section 2.2.4 presents new inverse equilibrium models for designing
optimal carbon tax and subsidy policies for promoting new renewable generation and limiting carbon
emissions. The optimal policy design models are linear programs with complementarity constraints.
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2.2.1 Nomenclature
Sets:
F set of GENCOs, f ∈F .
I set of nodes, i ∈ I .
H set of power generating types, h ∈H .
G set of generators, ( f , i,h) ∈ G .
K set of transmission lines, k ∈K .
Parameters:
X f ih capacity of generator ( f , i,h), which is of type h owned by GENCO f at
node i.
(MW)
Pi0, Qi0 parameters of linear demand function pi = Pi0− (Pi0/Qi0)qi, where pi
and qi are the price and quantity of electricity, respectively.
($/MWh), (MWh)
E f ih emissions rate of generator ( f , i,h). (ton/MWh)
H power transfer distribution factors matrix. dimensionless
Tk transmission capacity of line k. (MWh)
K f emissions allowance for GENCO f . (ton)
C f ih operating cost of generator ( f , i,h). ($/MWh)
I f ih investment cost of generator ( f , i,h). ($/MWh)
GENCOs’ decision variables:
x f ih power generation of generator ( f , i,h). (MWh)
∆x f ih expanded generation of generator ( f , i,h). (MWh)
s f j generation quantity sold by GENCO f to consumers at node j. (MWh)
c f sales (positive) or purchase (negative) of emissions certificates. (ton)
Grid owner’s decision variables:
yi power injection at node i. (MWh)
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Dual variables:
ρ f ih dual variables of Constraint (2.2). ($/MWh)
θ f dual variables of Constraint (2.3). ($/MWh)
λk− dual variables of Constraint (3.7). ($/MWh)
λk+ dual variables of Constraint (3.8). ($/MWh)
δ f dual variables of Constraint (3.21). ($/ton)
Incentive policy maker’s decision variables:
tax f ih tax (positive) or subsidy (negative) of generator ( f , i,h). ($/MWh)
Market clearing variables:
wi payment (charge) for generating (receiving) electricity at node i. ($/MWh)
ps emissions allowance price. ($/ton)
2.2.2 Energy Market Equilibrium Model
In this section, we summarize the non-arbitrage bilateral market equilibrium model presented in
[47]. This model simulates the Nash-Cournot competition of power suppliers in a bilateral market and
results in an LCP formulation, thus provides a modeling basis for our extended analysis of GEP under
environmental policies.
A group of power producersF compete in a Nash-Cournot manner to maximize their own profits by
determining the quantity of electricity generation and sales in a bilateral market. Each power producer
f ∈F owns a portfolio of generators ( f ih) ∈ G , with marginal cost C f ih and generation capacity X f ih.
The index ( f , i,h) indicates the ownership f ∈F , location i ∈ I , and type h ∈H of the generator,
respectively. The electricity network consists a group of nodesI , connected by a group of transmission
linesK . The linear demand function at node i is assumed to be pi = Pi0−(Pi0/Qi0)∑ f s f i. Here Pi0 and
Qi0 are parameters, pi is the price at node i, and s f i is the sales of producer f to node i. A producer gets
paid (pays) wi for generating (receiving) power at node i, thus w j−wi represents the cost of transmitting
power from node i to j. A grid owner is assumed to determine the power injection at each node yi to
maximize revenue ∑i wiyi subject to transmission constraints |∑i Hikyi| ≤ Tk,∀k ∈K , where H denotes
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the power transfer distribution factors matrix.
GENCO f ’s profit maximization problem is:
max ∑ j[Pj0− (Pj0/Q j0)(∑g sg j)−w j]s f j−∑i,h(C f ih−wi)x f ih (2.1)
s.t. x f ih ≤ X f ih (ρ f ih) ∀i,h (2.2)
∑ j s f j = ∑i,h x f ih (θ f ) (2.3)
s f j,x f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i, j,h. (2.4)
The grid owner’s revenue maximization problem is:
max ∑i wiyi (2.5)
s.t. −∑i Hikyi ≤ Tk− (λk−) ∀k (2.6)
∑i Hikyi ≤ Tk+ (λk+) ∀k. (2.7)
The market clearing condition is:
∑
f
s f i−∑
f ,h
x f ih = yi (wi) ∀i. (2.8)
Assuming Nash competition among GENCOs and the grid owner, the market equilibrium solution
can be obtained by solving the following first order conditions:
0≤ s f j ⊥−Pi0+(Pi0/Qi0)(2s f j +∑g6= f sg j)+w j +θ f ≥ 0 ∀ f , j (2.9)
0≤ x f ih ⊥C f ih−wi+ρ f ih−θ f ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.10)
0≤ ρ f ih ⊥ X f ih− x f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.11)
∑ j s f j = ∑i,h x f ih ∀ f (2.12)
wi+∑k Hik(λk−−λk+) = 0 ∀i (2.13)
0≤ λk− ⊥ Tk−+∑i Hikyi ≥ 0 ∀k (2.14)
0≤ λk+ ⊥ Tk+−∑i Hikyi ≥ 0 ∀k (2.15)
∑ f s f i−∑ f ,h x f ih = yi ∀i. (2.16)
An underlining assumption behind this formulation is that the GENCOs naively believe that their
decisions will not affect transmission prices. It is shown in [47] that the market equilibrium solution to
(2.9)-(2.16) uniquely exists.
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2.2.3 Generation Expansion Planning Model
We extend the market equilibrium model to include GEP. Our analysis and comparison of envi-
ronmental policies will be based on their effectiveness and efficiency in promoting new renewable
installments and reducing GHG emissions.
We assume the investment cost for extending the capacity of generator ( f , i,h) is I f ih, and the amount
of new capacities ∆x f ih are new decision variables of GENCOs’. The new profit maximization problem
of GENCO f under GEP becomes:
max ∑ j[Pj0− (Pj0/Q j0)(∑g sg j)−w j]s f j−∑i,h(C f ih−wi)x f ih−∑i,h I f ih∆x f ih (2.17)
s.t. x f ih ≤ X f ih+∆x f ih (ρ f ih) ∀i,h (2.18)
∑ j s f j = ∑i,h x f ih (θ f ) (2.19)
s f j,x f ih,∆x f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i, j,h. (2.20)
The grid owner’s problem remains the same. The market equilibrium conditions become:
0≤ ρ f ih ⊥ X f ih+∆x f ih− x f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.21)
0≤ ∆x f ih ⊥ I f ih−ρ f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.22)
Constraints (2.9)-(2.10) and (2.12)-(2.16). (2.23)
2.2.4 Cap-and-Trade Policy Model
The cap-and-trade policy sets a limit, or cap, on the amount of emissions each GENCO is allowed to
produce. GENCOs can trade their emissions allowances among themselves so that individual GENCO’s
emissions may differ from their initial allowances but the total amount does not exceed the overall cap.
Cap-and-trade has been a successful policy tool for limiting SOx and NOx emissions in the country.
A variant of a cap-and-trade plan for GHG emissions is proposed in the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, which was approved by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009 and is
still in consideration in the Senate.
In this section, we modify the GEP model from Section 2.2.3 to include the cap-and-trade policy.
In particular, each GENCO will face a new emissions allowances constraint, which is a soft constraint
and can be violated by purchasing additional allowances from other GENCOs. The market clearing
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conditions also include the balancing constraint between total sales and total purchases of the emissions
allowances, which enforces the pre-determined emissions cap on the entire market. While the target
of the cap-and-trade policy is to control emissions, it is expected to also encourage more investment
in renewable generation. To evaluate its effectiveness in doing so, we classify GENCOs’ generations
into four types: existing non-renewable, existing renewable, new non-renewable, and new renewable
generations, indicated by different values of h. The emissions rate of generator ( f , i,h) is denoted as
E f ih. The initial emissions allowances of GENCO f is assumed to be pre-determined and denoted as
K f . The market clearing price for emissions allowances is denoted as ps.
Under the cap-and-trade policy, GENCO f ’s profit maximization problem is:
max ∑ j[Pj0− (Pj0/Q j0)(∑g sg j)−w j]s f j−∑i,h(C f ih−wi)x f ih−∑i,h I f ih∆x f ih+ psc f (2.24)
s.t. ∑ih E f ihx f ih+ c f ≤ K f (δ f ) (2.25)
Constraints (3.2)-(2.20). (2.26)
The grid owner’s problem remains the same. The market equilibrium conditions become:
0≤ ρ f ih ⊥ X f ih+∆x f ih− x f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.27)
0≤ δ f ⊥ K f −∑i,h E f ihx f ih− c f ≥ 0 ∀ f (2.28)
δ f = ps ∀ f (2.29)
∑ f c f = 0 (2.30)
0≤ x f ih ⊥ (C f ih−wi)+ρ f ih−θ f ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.31)
0≤ ∆x f ih ⊥ I f ih−ρ f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.32)
Constraints (2.9)-(2.10) and (2.12)-(2.16). (2.33)
A solution that satisfies Constraints (2.27)-(2.33) yields a Nash equilibrium solution under this
model.
2.2.5 Optimal Incentive Policy Models
As alternatives to the cap-and-trade policy, taxes and subsidies also provide incentives for power
producers to invest more in renewable energy and less in non-renewables. In this section, we construct
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an optimal incentive policy design model to facilitate the comparison of cap-and-trade and incentives
in terms of cost effectiveness. The incentive policy design problem is inherently a bilevel problem.
The lower level is the Nash game among the GENCOs and the grid owner. Each GENCO solves a
profit maximization problem under exogenously determined tax and subsidy policies. The upper level’s
problem is to design the minimal incentive intervention in order to achieve a policy goal. In comparison
with cap-and-trade, we choose the policy goal to be the limit on total emissions.
Let tax f ih denote the tax (positive) or subsidy (negative) of generator ( f , i,h). Under such incentive
policies, GENCO f ’s profit maximization problem is:
max ∑ j[Pj0− (Pj0/Q j0)(∑g sg j)−w j]s f j−∑i,h(C f ih+ tax f ih−wi)x f ih−∑i,h I f ih∆x f ih (2.34)
s.t. Constraints (3.2)-(2.20). (2.35)
The grid owner’s problem remains the same. The market equilibrium conditions become:
0≤ ρ f ih ⊥ X f ih+∆x f ih− x f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.36)
0≤ x f ih ⊥ (C f ih+ tax f ih−wi)+ρ f ih−θ f ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.37)
0≤ ∆x f ih ⊥ I f ih−ρ f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h (2.38)
Constraints (2.9) and (2.12)-(2.16). (2.39)
The upper level’s optimal incentive policy design problem is formulated as the following bilevel
optimization problem:
min ∑i |tax f ih|/|I | (2.40)
s.t. ∑ f ih E f ihx f ih ≤ ∑ f K f (2.41)
Constraints (2.36)-(2.39). (2.42)
The objective (2.40) is to minimize the average tax or subsidy intervention; Constraint (2.41) defines
the goal of the policy, which could not be achieved without the incentives; Constraint (2.42) is the set
of optimality conditions for the lower level’s GEP problem under incentive policy intervention.
The incentive policy design model (2.40)-(2.42) could be modified to reflect different variations of
the policies. In particular, we consider the following variations:
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Uniform tax policy (UT): The taxes reflect the carbon taxes for non-renewable energy. Under this
policy, no subsidy is provided to renewable energy production and the taxes for non-renewable
energy production are the same across all nodes and all GENCOs. The following additional
constraints will results in this policy:
tax f ih = tax f jh ≥ 0 ∀ f , i, j,h. (2.43)
Uniform subsidy policy (US): The subsidies reflect the production tax credits or investment tax credits
for renewable energy. Under this policy, no tax is imposed on non-renewable energy production
and the subsidies for renewable energy production are the same across all nodes and all GENCOs.
The following additional constraints will result in this policy:
tax f ih = tax f jh ≤ 0 ∀ f , i, j,h. (2.44)
Uniform subsidy and tax policy (UST): This is a combination of UT and US. The following addi-
tional constraints will result in this policy:
tax f ih = tax f jh ∀ f , i, j,h. (2.45)
Non-uniform tax policy (NT): This policy differs from UT in that the taxes for non-renewable energy
production are allowed to differ from node to node. For those nodes where taxes are less effec-
tive (due to transmission congestion, for example), this policy has the flexibility to reduce the
unnecessarily high taxes. The following additional constraints will results in this policy:
tax f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h. (2.46)
Non-uniform subsidy policy (NS): Similar to NS, with non-uniform taxes and zero subsidy. The fol-
lowing additional constraints will results in this policy:
tax f ih ≤ 0 ∀ f , i,h. (2.47)
Non-uniform subsidy and tax policy (NST): This is a combination of NS and NT. This policy is the
most flexible variation in our analysis and is reflected in (2.40)-(2.42).
For notational convenience, in the remainder of the chapter, we will use the abbreviation CT to
denote the cap-and-trade policy.
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2.3 Numerical Analysis
A simple 5-bus test example is used to demonstrate our models. We will further discuss the advan-
tages and disadvantages between those policies with respect to five criteria.
2.3.1 Data
The 5-bus electricity network is shown in Figure 2.1. Nodes B, C, and D are demand nodes, and
nodes A, C, D, and E are supply nodes. There are two GENCOs in the market. GENCO 1 owns
generators in nodes A and C, and GENCO 2 owns generators in nodes D and E. The demand and supply
data are given in Table 2.1, and transmission data in Table 2.2. The emissions rates for non-renewable
and renewable generators are assumed to be 50 and 0 ton/MWh, respectively. We also assume that the
two GENCOs receive equal initial emissions allowances in the CT policy.
Figure 2.1 5-bus test example
Table 2.1 Demand and supply data
node Pi0 Qi0 C f i1 C f i2 C f i3 C f i4 I f i3 I f i4 X f i1 X f i2
A - - 1 8 6.5 1 2 15 60 300
B 200 600 - - - - - - - -
C 100 600 1 8 6.5 1 2 15 50 300
D 200 600 1 5 4.5 1 4 15 70 350
E - - 1 5 4.5 1 4 15 55 500
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Table 2.2 Transmission data
line A-B B-C C-D D-E E-A A-D
Tk 377 77 233 240 360 159
2.3.2 Results
In this section, we compare cap-and-trade with incentive polices with respect to five criteria: carbon
price and subsidy, renewable energy portfolio, total energy generation, GENCOs’ and grid owner’s total
profit, and government revenue, detailed in Sections 2.3.2.1-2.3.2.5.
2.3.2.1 Carbon Price and Subsidy
Figure 2.2 Policy comparison on carbon price and subsidy
In the cap-and-trade policy, the emissions allowances price ps (in $/ton) is a natural criterion for
evaluating the cost efficiency of the policy. For a given overall emissions cap, the lower the price is, the
higher the cost efficiency is. We also identify similar criteria from incentive policies for comparison.
For incentive policies, the average tax or subsidy ∑i |tax f ih||I | (in $/MWh) is a comparable criterion with a
different unit. To facilitate the comparison, we convert the emissions allowance price ps to ($/MWh)
using the emissions rate parameter E f ih. Figure 2.2 shows the tax or subsidy equivalent criteria of
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different policies as functions the overall emissions cap. We point out the following findings:
1. The UT and CT policies are equally cost effective on this criterion. This is not surprising since in
the CT, the carbon price ps is universal for all GENCOs, which is equivalent to a uniform carbon
tax. These two policies, however, do show different performances on other criteria.
2. US is intuitively similar to UT (and thus CT) in the sense that they both uniformly reduce the
cost differences between renewable and non-renewable generations. However, US turns out to be
slightly less cost effective than UT in certain segments of the curves. This is because of the fact
that electricity demands are decreasing functions of prices. Providing subsidies to GENCOs will
reduce the cost and price of electricity, which in turn leads to higher generation and emissions.
UT and CT have the opposite effect. Therefore, UT and CT could require less taxes to reduce the
same amount of emissions than US requires subsidies.
3. Nonuniform policies (NS, NT, and NST) are more effective than uniform ones (US, UT, and
UST) because the former policies have the flexibility to reduce the taxes and subsidies in places
where the cost effectiveness is limited by transmission or generation capacity constraints.
4. When the overall emissions cap is around 46,000 tons, the NS shows lower cost efficiency than
NT for the same reason of demand functions. When the cap is around 25,000 tons, however, the
NT appears to be more cost effectiveness than NS. This is largely due to transmission constraints.
Tax policies reduce generation, especially from non-renewable sources; whereas subsidy policies
increase generation, especially from renewable sources. Under transmission constraints, the cost
efficiency of subsidy policies is more likely to be discounted due to lack of transmission capacities
to deliver the increased generation.
5. Mixed tax and subsidy policies (UST and NST) are more cost effective than tax only (UT and
NT) and subsidy only (US and NS) ones. They reduce the level of incentives approximately by
half.
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Figure 2.3 Policy comparison on renewable energy portfolio
2.3.2.2 Renewable Energy Portfolio
Although none of the policies being modeled in Section 2.2 has a specific target on renewable
energy portfolio, they are all expected to stimulate more investment and generation of renewable energy
and thus increase the renewable energy portfolio. In this section, the criterion for policy comparison
is the percentage of renewable energy generation as a function of overall emissions cap. This criterion
indicates the policies’ effectiveness in stimulating new investments in renewable energy. Figure 2.3
shows the policy comparison on renewable energy portfolio. We point out the following findings:
1. As the overall emissions cap reduces from 47,000 tons to 0, CT gradually increases the renewable
energy portfolio from about 20% to 100% in a straight line. All other incentive policies could
only increase the renewable energy portfolio in step functions, showing lack of flexibility in
continuous control. This is due to the nature of incentive policies. Under the pure incentive
policy models, GENCOs invest in the less costly generation exclusively, regardless how close the
costs of renewable and non-renewable generation are. When the incentives are large enough to
offset the cost difference, GENCOs tend to switch to the other generation all together, resulting
in the step function type of behaviors.
2. Among the incentive policies, NST is the most flexible policy thus its curve looks closest to CT.
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It also outperforms NS and NT, representing the advantage of combining taxes and subsidies over
using them alone.
3. UST overlaps with US for the most part. UST also out performs UT around the 20,000-ton cap.
2.3.2.3 Total Electricity Generation
Figure 2.4 Policy comparison on total electricity generation
Total electricity generation is another criterion for comparison, indicating the policies’ impact on
electricity prices. The lower the generation, the higher the price. Figure 2.3 shows the policy compar-
ison on total electricity generation as a function of overall emissions cap. We point out the following
findings:
1. US increases electricity generation as the overall emissions cap reduces. This is because a lower
cap will lead to more subsidies, lower cost, thus more generation.
2. Opposite to US, the UT and CT policies lead to reduced electricity generation.
3. UST results in a sharp decrease in generation around the 46,000-ton cap, which coincides with
the sudden increase in renewable energy portfolio. Below that cap level, the generation curve is
relatively flat, indicating the overall balance between taxes and subsidies.
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4. NS overlaps with US for the most part. When the cap is smaller than around 22,000 tons, NS has
lower generation because it provides less subsidies than US.
5. NST has lower generation than UST because, as demonstrated in Figure 2.6, NST is tax-dominant
whereas UST is subsidy-dominant. When the cap is smaller than around 10,000 tons, NST be-
comes more subsidy-dominant, which causes its performance to change direction.
6. NST shows similar performance with NT due to its tax-dominant nature. The subsidy components
in NST could also result in higher generation.
7. NT results in higher generation than UT in certain segments due to its non-uniform nature of
policy. When the overall emissions cap becomes tighter, it results in lower generation than UT.
This can be attributed to transmission congestions caused by non-renewable energy generation
where NT does not impose taxes.
2.3.2.4 GENCOs’ and Grid Owner’s Total Profit
Figure 2.5 Policy comparison on GENCOs’ and grid owner’s total profit
We also compare the policies’ impact on GENCOs’ and grid owner’s total profit as a function of
overall emissions cap in Figure 2.5. The total profit is calculated as the summation of objective values
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of all GENCOs and the grid owner. This criterion also indicate the potential perceptions and reactions
from GENCOs and grid owners towards the policies. We point out the following findings:
1. Under CT, the total profit is expected to decrease as the overall emissions cap gets tighter.
Counter-intuitively, the opposite trend is observed when the cap is not very tight. This can be
explained with the fact that the original Nash equilibrium without CT may not be Pareto optimal;
when CT introduces additional emissions constraints, the new equilibrium solution dominates
the original one in terms of total profit. Of course, this phenomenon soon gets offset by the
increasingly tight cap, which eventually leads to a gradually decreasing total profit.
2. UT and CT result in different total profits. This is because under UT, the government extracts
taxes from the GENCOs, whereas CT only redistributes profits within the GENCOs.
3. US provides the most generous subsidies to GENCOs, thus leads to highest total profits. NS is
similar but less so due to its flexibility in reducing subsidies where not effective or necessary.
4. UT and NT have the opposite effect as US and NS.
5. UST and NST show similar performance as total electricity generation for similar reasons ex-
plained in Section 2.3.2.3.
6. The NST has a peak around the 21,000-ton cap. This is largely caused by transmission capacity
limits, which could affect the effectiveness of incentives, possibly causing the total profit to either
increase or decrease.
2.3.2.5 Government Revenue
Government revenue, either positive from taxes or negative from subsidies, as a function of overall
emissions cap is calculated as another criterion for comparison with CT, which is revenue neutral for
government. Results are shown in Figure 2.6 and findings are highlighted as follows:
1. US requires a significant amount of subsidy expenses to be effective. NS is similar but less so.
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Figure 2.6 Government’s income
2. UT results in positive revenues, which nevertheless decreases and eventually vanishes as the cap
becomes tighter. This is because GENCOs are switching to renewable energy to avoid high tax
penalties.
3. UST and NST are generally balanced between tax revenues and subsidy expenses, with occasional
dominance of one incentive over the other.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we compare the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade and carbon taxes policies under a
generation expansion planning context in an electricity market. The contributions of this study include
integrated modeling framework for environmental policies under generation capacity expansion, novel
inverse equilibrium approaches for optimal tax and subsidy policies, and multiple perspectives of policy
comparison.
We make the following summarizing remarks on our findings from Section 2.3:
1. The similarities and differences between cap-and-trade and carbon taxes policies are demon-
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strated in Figures 2.2-2.6. They show similar performances in terms of market-wide uniform
carbon taxes and total electricity generation; cap-and-trade outperforms carbon taxes in continu-
ous and flexible control of renewable energy portfolio and total profit of GENCOs and the grid
owner; carbon taxes create a revenue stream to the government, whereas cap-and-trade does not.
2. The uniform subsidy and uniform tax policies have similar effectiveness in terms of minimal
required tax and subsidy in $/MWh and stimulating new renewable generation installation. How-
ever, they both have their own limitations. Subsidies require expenditure of tax payers money,
whereas taxes are politically unpopular. A combination of both appears to be a better policy than
either one alone. Subsidies have also shown the tendency of resulting in misleadingly low energy
prices, which in turn lead to higher consumptions and thus more emissions.
3. Nonuniform tax only or subsidy only policies show superior performance than uniform ones.
When taxes and subsidies are combined, uniform policy appears to be a more smooth function of
overall emissions cap.
There are caveats in our analysis. First, we consider a small 5-bus example with artificial data for
numerical analysis, which could fail to capture some characteristics of real energy markets. Second, the
optimal incentive policy models are linear programs with complementarity constraints, the global opti-
mal solutions of which are computationally challenging to obtain. It is our expectation that our analysis
would shed light on new perspectives and approaches to qualitative and quantitative comparisons of
environmental policies.
One of future research directions is to also include renewable portfolio standard into analysis, which
would require an extension of load serving entities into our models to be the point of such regulation.
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CHAPTER 3. CAP-AND-TRADE VS. CARBON TAXES: A QUANTITATIVE
COMPARISON FROM A GENERATION EXPANSION PLANNING PERSPECTIVE
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ABSTRACT
We compare the effectiveness and efficiency of cap-and-trade and carbon tax policies in a generation
expansion planning framework. The effectiveness refers to a policys capability to control the amount of
carbon emissions, and the efficiency is measured with respect to seven criteria: average emissions price,
actual emissions, renewable energy portfolio, total generation, total profit of Gencos and grid owner,
economic welfare, and emissions adjusted economic welfare. Cap-and-trade and four variations of car-
bon tax policies are integrated in a game-theoretic based generation expansion planning model to assess
their impacts on new investment in renewable energy generation capacity. A case study is conducted
on a 30-bus test system, and numerical results provide insights on the advantages and disadvantages of
these policies.
3.1 Introduction
The push toward a cleaner and more sustainable environment is resulting in new pressures on the
electric power industry. The numerous fossil fired power plants that operate today make the industry
one of the largest man-made carbon dioxide emitters. There are many climate change initiatives in
various stages of development and implementation that will strongly influence the future course of the
industry. Cap-and-trade (C&T) and carbon tax are among the most widely implemented and debated
environmental regulations. Also known as emissions trading, C&T is a market-based policy for con-
trolling pollutant emissions. Generating companies (Gencos) are required to hold an equivalent amount
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of allowances to offset their pollutant emissions. Initial allowances can be grandfathered or auctioned
through a regulatory agency, and can be traded later on among Gencos. The total amount of emissions
allowances is limited by a pre-determined cap, which will be gradually tightened over time. The Eu-
ropean Union emissions trading scheme is the largest multi-national greenhouse gas emissions trading
scheme in the world. In the U.S., a successful SO2 C&T program was established under the framework
of the Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative [10] and
the Western Climate Initiative (including four Canadian provinces) [13] have also started CO2 trading
programs. Carbon tax is an incentive-based policy that levies taxes on burning fossil fuels or emitting
carbon dioxide [49]. The motivation is to reflect the negative externalities caused by non-renewable
electricity generation but not directly accounted for in energy prices. A number of European coun-
tries have implemented carbon taxes, including Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK. Some states in the U.S. are also considering imposing carbon taxes.
Many scholars have weighed in the discussion or debate between C&T and carbon tax [34, 36, 39,
50, 56, 66, 67], some being in favor of one policy over the other. Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann [19] argue
that a carbon tax is a better response to global warming than C&T due to its simplicity and capability to
provide an immediate carbon price signal. Metcalf [63] discusses the issues that should be taken into ac-
count in designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, including revenue distribution,
administration, impact on households, application to C&T, and efficiency in the face of uncertainty. The
author also responses to criticisms of a carbon tax. Keohane [56] argues that C&T has a number of im-
portant advantages over a carbon tax, such as political feasibility, cost effectiveness, broad participation,
equity in the international context, and controlling the cumulative quantity of emissions. Johnson [53]
proposes a decarbonization strategy for the electricity sector by “imposing carbon fees and applying
the revenue exclusively to subsidize new, low-carbon generation sources.” Ruth et al. [70] investigate
the economic and energy impacts from participation in the regional greenhouse gas initiative through
a case study of the State of Maryland. In [45], we presented an earlier and much simplified model for
comparing C&T and carbon tax policies. In that model, all initial allowances are assumed to be grand-
fathered, thus no auction process is captured. Moreover, it is a single-period model, which cannot be
used to study Gencos’ banking behavior and market dynamics over time as the emissions cap decreases.
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Our study chimes in the discussion with some new perspectives. First, we compare C&T and carbon
tax policies from the perspective of generation expansion planning (GEP). In 2007, the U.S. renewable
energy capacity accounted for 10.9% of its total electric power industry net summer capacity, and the
actual generation was 8.5% [15]. To achieve the “20% renewable energy by 2020” renewable portfolio
standard (RPS) proposed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, as well as other RPS
goals already established in more than thirty states in the U.S., significant renewable energy expansion
is essential in the next decade. We construct a GEP model to provide a quantitative framework for the
implementation and comparison of C&T and carbon tax policies. Second, our analysis of carbon taxes
is generalized to include tax credits and subsidies, such as the production and investment tax credits
being offered to renewable energy Gencos. Over the past years, the availability of these tax credits (or
lack of them) has had apparent effect on new renewable capacity installment in the U.S. [16]. Third, we
propose a bilevel optimization approach to determine four variations of tax policies that are comparable
with C&T with respect to their effectiveness in controlling carbon emissions. Last but not least, we de-
fine eight efficiency criteria to facilitate the comparison: weighted average carbon price/tax, emissions
price over time, actual emissions, renewable energy portfolio, total generation, total profit of Gencos
and grid owner, economic welfare, and emissions adjusted economic welfare.
Effectiveness and efficiency are two important measures of an environmental policy. A policy’s
effectiveness refers to its capability to achieve a certain goal (such as tons of emissions reduced or
percentage of renewable energy generation increased), whereas its efficiency measures what it takes to
achieve that goal (such as the amount of taxes collected or tax credits paid). C&T focuses on policy ef-
fectiveness by explicitly limiting the overall emissions cap, but the price of carbon is left for the market
to determine. On the other hand, a carbon tax focuses on policy efficiency by levying a predetermined
tax rate, but the actual reduction of carbon emissions is subject to market manipulation. To facilitate a
meaningful and fair comparison, we design a carbon tax that has an equivalent effectiveness in terms
of emissions cap. This carbon tax policy will be compared with C&T against the aforementioned eight
efficiency criteria.
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GEP has been a topic of intensive study in the electricity industry, especially after the transition
from a vertically integrated operational monopoly to a deregulated structure that embraces competition
and interaction among multiple market participants [29, 48]. Several game theoretic models have been
proposed for GEP in market competition settings [24, 30, 37, 47, 81]. Our model is a modified version
of the non-arbitrage bilateral market equilibrium model presented in [47]. This model not only captures
the major factors of GEP and market competition but also is computationally tractable, thus it provides
a good basis for our extended analysis of GEP under C&T and carbon tax policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we first introduce a baseline GEP
model and then make two extensions that incorporate C&T and carbon tax policies. A case study on a
simple 30-bus network is reported in Section 3.3, which analyzes the numerical results against the eight
comparison criteria in detail. Section 3.4 concludes the paper.
3.2 Models
3.2.1 Nomenclature
Sets:
F set of Gencos, f ,g ∈F .
I set of nodes, i, j ∈I .
H set of power generation types of technologies, h ∈H , 1 is renewable, 2 is
nonrenewable.
B set of load blocks, b ∈B.
L set of transmission lines, l ∈L .
Parameters:
X f ih capacity of existing generator ( f , i,h), which is of technology h owned by
Genco f at node i.
(MW)
P0itb,Q
0
itb parameters of the inverse demand function p = P
0
itb− P
0
itb
Q0itb
q, where p and q are
electricity price and quantity, respectively.
($/MWh, MWh)
E f ih carbon emissions rate of generator ( f , i,h). (ton/MWh)
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H power transfer distribution factors matrix. dimensionless
Wl transmission capacity of line l. (MW)
C f iht operating cost of generator ( f , i,h) at period t. ($/MW)
I f ih investment cost of generator ( f , i,h). ($/MW)
Kt carbon emissions allowance cap at period t. (ton)
Lb duration of load block b. (hour)
β discount rate. dimensionless
T number of planning periods. dimensionless
∆X f iht maximal expansion capacity for technology h for Genco f at node i in period
t.
(MW)
Gencos’ decision variables:
x f ihtb power generation of generator ( f , i,h) at load block b of period t. (MW)
∆x f iht expanded generation of generator ( f , i,h) at period t. (MW)
s f jtb generation quantity sold by Genco f to consumers at node j at load block b of
period t.
(MW)
a f t bidding emissions allowance certificates of Genco f at period t. (ton)
k f t banked emissions allowance certificates of Genco f at period t. (ton)
Grid owner’s decision variables:
yitb power injection at node i at load block b of period t. (MW)
Dual variables:
θ f tb dual variables of Constraint (3.2). ($/MWh)
ρ f ihtb dual variables of Constraint (3.3). ($/MWh)
γ f iht dual variables of Constraint (3.4). ($/MW)
λ+ltb dual variables of Constraint (3.7). ($/MWh)
λ−ltb dual variables of Constraint (3.8). ($/MWh)
δ f t dual variables of Constraint (3.22). ($/ton)
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Policy maker’s decision variables:
taxiht tax (positive) or subsidy (negative) of generator (i,h) at period t. ($/MWh)
Market clearing variables:
witb payment (charge) for generating (receiving) electricity at node i at load block
b of period t.
($/MWh)
pCO2t emissions allowance price in auction policy at period t. ($/ton)
3.2.2 Baseline Generation Expansion Planning Model
We consider an electricity transmission network, which consists of a set of nodes I connected by
a set of transmission lines L . A group of GencosF compete in a Nash-Cournot manner to maximize
their own profits by generating and selling electricity in a bilateral market. Each Genco f ∈F owns
a portfolio of generation units with varying marginal costs C f ih, capacities X f ih, and carbon emissions
rate E f ih. The index ( f , i,h) indicates the ownership f ∈F , location i ∈ I , and type of technology
h ∈H of the generation unit. If profitable, Gencos will expand the generation capacities, at the cost of
I f ih for generator ( f , i,h). At each node i ∈I , the demand of electricity is characterized by an inverse
linear demand function pitb = P0itb− P
0
itb
Q0itb
∑ f s f itb, where P0itb and Q
0
itb are parameters, pitb is the price at
node i at load block b in period t, and s f itb is the electricity sales from Genco f to node i at load block
b in period t. This definition of inverse demand function captures the differences of demand elasticity
in varying locations i, time periods t, and seasonal load variations b. A Genco gets paid (pays) wi for
generating (receiving) power at node i, thus w j−wi is the cost of transmitting power from node i to j.
A grid owner is assumed to coordinate the power flows to maximize his revenue subject to transmission
line capacity constraints. It is assumed that all players have complete information of each other and that
there is no arbitragers in the market.
Consider the baseline scenario in which neither C&T nor carbon taxes is imposed on the energy
market, and all Gencos solve a multi-period GEP problem to maximize the present value of their own
profits over the next T periods. Genco f ’s GEP problem is formulated as follows:
maxs,x,∆x ∑ j,t,bβ t−1Lb[P0jtb− (P0jtb/Q0jtb)(∑g sg jtb)−w jtb]s f jtb
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−∑i,h,t,bβ t−1Lb(C f iht −witb)x f ihtb−∑i,h,t β t−1I f ih∆x f iht (3.1)
s.t. ∑ j s f jtb = ∑i,h x f ihtb (θ f tb) ∀t,b (3.2)
x f ihtb ≤ X f ih+∑t−1τ=1∆x f ihτ (ρ f ihtb) ∀i,h, t,b (3.3)
∆x f iht ≤ ∆X f iht (γ f iht) ∀i,h, t (3.4)
s f jtb,x f ihtb,∆x f iht ≥ 0 ∀ f , i, j,h,b. (3.5)
The first term in the objective function (3.1) is the revenue from electricity sales less transmission cost.
The second term is the generation cost adjusted by transmission revenue, and the third one is the invest-
ment cost. All revenues and costs are converted to the present value with a discount factor β . Constraint
(3.2) is the balance of production and sales; (3.3) is the generation capacity constraint, which allows
Gencos to expand their generation capacities in any period; Constraint (3.4) shows the expansion limits
for Genco f ; and (3.5) requires that all sales and generation be non-negative. We make the simplifying
assumption that the investment lead time is one period for all generation technologies, as reflected in
constraint (3.3). The Greek letters in parentheses are the dual variables of the associated constraints.
The grid owner is assumed to be a price taker with respect to the transmission cost wi. His revenue
maximization problem for all period t and load block b is the following linear program:
maxy ∑i witbyitb (3.6)
s.t. ∑i Hilyitb ≤Wl (λ+ltb) ∀l (3.7)
−∑i Hilyitb ≤Wl (λ−ltb) ∀l. (3.8)
The decision variable yitb is the net injection to node i, which equals power generation less consumption.
Since the sign of yitb is unconstrained, the term witbyitb computes the grid owner’s revenue (positive)
or loss (negative). The objective function (3.6) maximizes this transmission revenue. In constraints
(3.7) and (3.8), H denotes the power transfer distribution factors matrix [71], which is derived from the
Kirchhoff’s laws and the network topology. The term ∑i Hilyitb computes the amount of power flow
through line l, which is constrained in (3.7)-(3.8) to be within the transmission capacity Wl in either
direction.
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Under a Nash equilibrium, the grid owner’s and all the Gencos’ linear programming problems
should achieve optimality at the same time. Additionally, in order for the market to clear, the grid
owner’s power injection decision yitb and all the Gencos’ power generation x f ihtb and sales s f itb decisions
must be balanced:
∑ f s f itb−∑ f ,h x f ihtb = yitb (witb) ∀i, t,b. (3.9)
The shadow price of this constraint determines the transmission cost witb. Therefore, we obtain neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for a market equilibrium:
0≤ s f jtb ⊥ β t−1Lb(−P0itb+ P
0
itb
Q0itb
(s f jtb+∑g sg jtb)+w jtb)+θ f tb ≥ 0 ∀ f , j, t,b (3.10)
0≤ x f ihtb ⊥ β t−1Lb(C f iht −witb)+ρ f ihtb−θ f tb ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h, t,b (3.11)
0≤ ∆x f iht ⊥ β t−1I f ih+ γ f iht −∑b∑Tτ=t+1ρ f ihτb ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h, t (3.12)
γ f iht ⊥ ∆X f iht −∆x f iht ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h, t (3.13)
∑ j s f jtb = ∑i,h x f ihtb ∀ f , t,b (3.14)
0≤ ρ f ihtb ⊥ X f ih− x f ihtb+∑t−1τ=1∆x f ihτ ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h, t,b (3.15)
witb+∑l Hil(λ−ltb−λ+ltb) = 0 ∀i, t,b (3.16)
0≤ λ−ltb ⊥ Tl−+∑i Hilyitb ≥ 0 ∀l, t,b (3.17)
0≤ λ+ltb ⊥ Tl+−∑i Hilyitb ≥ 0 ∀l, t,b (3.18)
Market clearing condition (3.9). (3.19)
Here, (3.10)-(3.15) and (3.16)-(3.18) are the optimality conditions of (3.1)-(3.5) and (3.6)-(3.8), respec-
tively.
Due to the assumption that the grid owner and all Gencos are profit-maximization oriented and the
fact that renewable energy is economically disadvantaged compared to conventional fossil-fuel based
generation technologies, very little investment in new renewable generation capacities can be expected
as a result of the market equilibrium. This is the very motivation of environmental policies such as C&T
and carbon taxes that aim to stimulate more investment in new renewable energy and achieve a more
sustainable energy portfolio.
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3.2.3 GEP under Cap-and-Trade
Under the C&T regulation, an overall emissions cap is imposed on the energy system. Gencos must
compete for the limited amount of allowances and make their power generation decisions accordingly.
The amount of emissions that Gencos are allowed to produce must not exceed the equivalent amount of
the allowances that they hold. Allowances can be banked or traded among Gencos, but the total amount
of allowances, and thus emissions, will not exceed the overall cap. A variation of C&T is that Gencos
receive their initial allowances through grandfathering rather than the allowance market; this case is
discussed in [45]. In this paper, we assume that all allowances must be purchased.
We assume that Gencos take the allowance price pCO2t as exogenously determined, and then deter-
mine the amount of allowances a f t that they want to purchase from the allowances market. Genco f ’s
GEP problem is formulated as follows::
maxs,x,∆x,a,k ∑ j,t,bβ t−1Lb[P0jtb− (P0jtb/Q0jtb)(∑g sg jtb)−w jtb]s f jtb
−∑i,h,t,bβ t−1Lb(C f iht −witb)x f ihtb−∑i,h,t β t−1I f ih∆x f iht
−∑t β t−1 pCO2t a f t (3.20)
s.t. Constraints (3.2)-(3.5) (3.21)
∑ihb LbE f ihx f ihtb = a f t + k f (t−1)− k f t (δ f t) ∀t. (3.22)
Compared to the baseline model (3.1)-(3.5), the additional term in the objective function (3.20) is the
cost of allowances. The variable a f t is the quantity of purchase (positive) or sales (negative) of emissions
allowances. Constraint (3.22) requires the balance between allowances and emissions. The left-hand-
side is the emissions from electricity generation; the variable k f t is the banked amount of allowances,
thus the right-hand-side computes the available allowances for period t.
The grid owner’s problem (3.6)-(3.8) stays the same. The market clearing conditions include (3.9)
and:
∑ f a f t ≤ Kt (pCO2t ) ∀t. (3.23)
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This condition requires that the total allowances acquired by the Gencos do not exceed the overall cap
of the energy system, and that the allowance price should reflect the shadow price. It should be noted
that although the overall emissions allowances are capped by Kt for all periods, the actual emissions of
a particular period could possibly exceed the cap due to extra allowances banked from previous periods.
The market equilibrium conditions become:
Constraints (3.10), (3.12)-(3.18) (3.24)
0≤ x f ihtb ⊥ β t−1Lb(C f iht −witb)+ρ f ihtb−θ f tb+Lbδ f tE f ih ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h, t,b (3.25)
0≤ k f t ⊥ δ f t −δ f (t+1) ≥ 0 ∀ f , t (3.26)
0≤ a f t ⊥ β t−1 pCO2t −δ f t ≥ 0 ∀ f , t (3.27)
∑ihb E f ihx f ihtb+ k f t = a f t + k f t−1 ∀ f , t (3.28)
Market clearing conditions (3.9) (3.29)
0≤ pCO2t ⊥ Kt −∑ f a f t ≥ 0 ∀t (3.30)
3.2.4 GEP under Carbon Taxes
Under the carbon tax policy, electricity generation is taxed on a $/MWh basis. We also allow
negative taxes, which represent subsidies. Under such policy, Genco f ’s GEP problem becomes:
maxs,x,∆x ∑ j,t,bβ t−1Lb[P0jtb− (P0jtb/Q0jtb)(∑g sg jtb)−w jtb]s f jtb
−∑i,h,t,bβ t−1Lb(C f iht −witb+ taxiht)x f ihtb−∑i,h,t β t−1I f ih∆x f iht (3.31)
s.t. Constraints (3.2)-(3.5). (3.32)
The grid owner’s problem (3.16)-(3.18) and the market clearing condition both stay the same, thus
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium are:
0≤ x f ihtb ⊥ β t−1Lb(C f iht −witb+ taxiht)+ρ f ihtb−θ f tb ≥ 0 ∀ f , i,h, t,b (3.33)
Constraint (3.10), (3.12)-(3.19). (3.34)
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3.2.5 Carbon Tax Policy Model
The variable taxiht is treated as an exogenous parameter in model (3.31)-(3.32), but it is actually a
decision to be made by policy makers. We present a bilevel optimization model to determine the carbon
tax policy in such a way that it will result in an equivalent yet implicit cap on carbon emissions of the
market equilibrium. As such, the effectiveness of the the carbon tax policy is set side by side with C&T,
and they are then compared with respect to the eight efficiency criteria. The carbon tax policy model is
formulated as follows:
mintax,s,x,∆x,a,k 1|I×H |T ∑i,h,t |taxiht | (3.35)
s.t. Constraints (3.33)-(3.34) (3.36)
∑tτ=1∑ f ,i,h,b LbE f ihx f ihτb ≤ ∑tτ=1 Kτ ,∀t. (3.37)
At the lower level, the Nash equilibrium conditions (3.33)-(3.34) are imposed to anticipate the impact of
carbon taxes on the market equilibrium, in which the taxes are treated as parameters. Constraint (3.37)
requires that the taxes should be sufficient to achieve the same effectiveness as C&T in terms of caps
on total emissions. Notice that cumulative emissions caps are used in (3.37), which is consistent with
C&T. In C&T, actual emissions are not necessarily bounded by individual years’ caps due to banked
allowances from previous years, but cumulative emissions are bounded by cumulative caps because
borrowing allowances from future years is not allowed. The objective function (3.35) is to minimize
the average amount of taxes or subsidies. The resulting model is a linear program with linear comple-
mentarity constraints. Several existing algorithms and software are available for solving such problem
[17, 18, 38, 43, 7, 6, 78].
Additional constraints can be used to formulate variations of the carbon tax policy model (3.35)-
(3.37). We consider the following four variations:
• Uniform tax (UT): This is a tax only policy, thus no subsidies or tax credits are provided.
The amount of taxes for a same generation type is also uniform across all nodes and consis-
tent throughout the entire time horizon. This policy can be formulated by adding the following
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constraints to (3.35)-(3.37):
taxiht = taxi′ht ′ ≥ 0,∀i, i′, t, t ′,h.
• Nodal uniform tax (UTn): This policy differs with UT in that taxes can vary by time period but
must stay uniform across nodes:
taxiht = taxi′ht ≥ 0,∀i, i′, t,h.
• Nonuniform tax (NT): This policy differs with UT in that the amount of taxes can differ by node
and by time period:
taxiht ≥ 0,∀i,h, t.
• Nonuniform tax and subsidy (NTS): Both taxes and subsidies can be applied at the same time,
and the amount of taxes and subsidies can differ by node and by time period. This policy is fully
captured by the model (3.35)-(3.37), thus no additional constraints are needed.
3.3 Numerical Analysis
We conduct a case study on an IEEE 30-bus transmission network to demonstrate our approach.
Network data are from [80] with modification. As shown in Figure 3.1, nodes 1, 2, 5, 8, 11 and 13 are
supply nodes, and 2, 3-5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14-21, 23, 24, 26, 29 and 30 are demand nodes. Each supply
node has one renewable generator and one non-renewable generator. There are three Gencos in the
market. Genco 1 owns generators at nodes 2 and 5, Genco 2 owns generators at nodes 1 and 13, and
Genco 3 owns generators at nodes 8 and 11. The demand and supply data are given in Table 3.1, and
the transmission data are given in Table 3.2. We assume the discount factor β is 1 since we only study
three periods. For computational tractability, we consider only one load block and three planning peri-
ods in this case study. Computational results are obtained using General Algebraic Modeling System
(GAMS) [6] and Interior Point Optimizer (IPOPT) [7]. We used a desktop computer with a 3.00GHz
Intel Pentium CPU. It takes 5 to 10 minutes to obtain one solution.
Computational results for C&T and the four variations of carbon tax policies are obtained. We
first specify 551,000 tons as the overall emissions cap for the three periods, which is a little bit higher
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Figure 3.1 30-bus network example
than the total emissions under the baseline GEP case. The investment capacity ∆X f iht are all set to be
500 MW. We compute Nash equilibrium solutions for C&T from (3.24)-(3.30), and for the carbon tax
policies from (3.35)-(3.37) with additional constraints for the variations. We then iteratively decrease
the overall emissions cap until zero. Eight efficiency criteria are computed from these results and plotted
as functions of the overall emissions cap for three periods. Results and interpretations are provided in
the following subsections.
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Table 3.1 Demand and supply data
node Pi0t Qi0t C f i1t C f i2t I f i1t I f i2t X f i1 X f i2
1 - - 2 0 8 20 100 20
2 300 600 2 0 8 20 200 30
3 300 450 - - - - - -
4 300 480 - - - - - -
5 300 510 2 0 8 20 400 50
6 - - - - - - - -
7 300 570 - - - - - -
8 300 540 2 0 8 20 300 30
9 - - - - - - - -
10 300 480 - - - - - -
11 - - 2 0 8 20 400 40
12 300 420 - - - - - -
13 - - 2 0 8 20 300 40
14 300 360 - - - - - -
15 300 330 - - - - - -
16 300 300 - - - - - -
17 300 330 - - - - - -
18 300 360 - - - - - -
19 300 390 - - - - - -
20 300 420 - - - - - -
21 300 450 - - - - - -
22 - - - - - - - -
23 300 510 - - - - - -
24 300 540 - - - - - -
25 - - - - - - - -
26 300 540 - - - - - -
27 - - - - - - - -
28 - - - - - - - -
29 300 450 - - - - - -
30 300 420 - - - - - -
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Table 3.2 Transmission data
line capacity line capacity line capacity
1-2 13,000 4-12 6,500 21-22 3,200
1-3 13,000 12-13 6,500 15-23 1,600
2-4 6,500 12-14 3,200 22-24 1,600
3-4 13,000 12-15 3,200 23-24 1,600
2-5 13,000 12-16 3,200 24-25 1,600
2-6 6,500 14-15 1,600 25-26 1,600
4-6 9,000 16-17 1,600 25-27 1,600
5-7 7,000 15-18 1,600 28-27 6,500
6-7 13,000 18-19 1,600 27-29 1,600
6-8 3,200 19-20 3,200 27-30 1,600
6-9 6,500 10-20 3,200 29-30 1,600
6-10 3,200 10-17 3,200 8-28 3,200
9-11 6,500 10-21 3,200 6-28 3,200
9-10 6,500 10-22 3,200 - -
3.3.1 Carbon Price
The carbon price pCO2t ($/ton) and carbon tax (or subsidy) |taxiht | ($/MWh) are natural efficiency
indicators for comparison. However, individual period’s carbon price or taxes may not be able to reflect
overall policies’ impacts. We calculate the weighted average emissions price as the indicators rather
than prices themselves. The weighted average emissions price ($/ton) is defined as ∑ f iht tax f ihx f iht∑ f iht E f ihx f iht for
tax policies, and ∑t p
CO2
t ·a f t
∑ f iht E f ihx f iht
for C&T. The weighted average emissions price give us an evaluation of
actual payment on per carbon emissions through the whole planning horizon. This indicator is plotted
as functions of K1 +K2 +K3 in Figure 3.2, which correspond to time periods t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3
respectively. We make the following observations from this figure:
• NTS can have negative price, which means the tax policy is dominant when the cap is loose. The
average emissions price is the lowest due to the balance between tax and subsidy policies in NTS.
• NT has the second lowest weight average carbon price. Since in NT, tax can vary across nodes.
In some nodes the tax could be zero although they produce non-renewable energy, and the tax can
be high in some area although the area is already clean, thus the total payment for per emissions
is low in NT.
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Figure 3.2 Weighted average carbon price
• UT has the highest weighted average carbon price. When the emissions cap is low, and the tax
will be very high in the first period to reduce the carbon emissions (because in the first period,
there is no expanded renewable energy.) Since in UT, the carbon price is the same across all
periods, the carbon price keep high, then the weighted price will be higher than others.
• When the cap is greater than 350,000 tons, C&T and UT are almost overlapped, but greater
than UTn. Because in C&T, constraints (3.26) and (3.27) requires δ f t −δ f (t+1) ≥ 0, 0≤−δ f t +
pCO2t ⊥ a f t . As long as the auction amount a f t is not zero, δ f t = pCO2t ≥ 0, and if there is banked
allowance, pCO2t = p
CO2
t+1 . But in UTn, there are no similar constraints, the carbon tax in the
first period could be different than second periods, UTn is smaller than C&T for the weighted
average price when the cap is large. UT have uniform tax all the time, it automatically satisfies
taxt = taxt+1, similar to p
CO2
t = p
CO2
t+1 . This is the reason UT and C&T are similar when the cap
is large.
• when the total cap is less than 180,000 tons, C&T is closed to UTn. Because in both C&T and
UTn, the regulator can be traded as a special Genco who makes profit by selling emissions. The
difference between C&T and UTn is the banked allowance from UTn is paid at future period’s
price, while the banked allowance in C&T is paid at current period’s price. When the cap is tight,
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no allowance is banked, C&T and UTn are equivalent.
3.3.2 Emissions Price Over Time
Figure 3.3 Emissions price over time
The emissions prices are plotted as functions of periods in Figure 3.3. The total emissions reduction
is 40% compared to baseline GEP model. We find that UT and C&T are all constant in three periods.
The reason is explained in 3.3.1. For NT, NTS and UTn, the first period’s prices are all zero due to
surplus of first period’s emissions allowance. As the emissions gets tighter, the emissions price goes up.
Averagely, NT and NTS’s prices are less than others, since environmental policies are inactive in some
places. NTS is less than NT, because the subsidy is designed to promote renewable energy, while the
tax is to reduce non-renewable energy.
3.3.3 Actual Emissions
The actual emissions ∑ f ihtb LbE f ihx f ihtb are plotted as functions of K1 +K2 +K3 in Figure 3.4. We
find that UTn, NT, NTS and C&T are all on the 45 degree line, which means that the actual emissions
under these policies will be as much as the emissions cap. However, the actual emissions under UT are
lower than the cap. The reason is that the time-consistent requirement makes UT unable to meet the
43
Figure 3.4 Total actual emissions
emissions cap exactly. If the taxes were to be lowered in the first period, then the first period’s emissions
would go above the cap.
3.3.4 Renewable Energy Portfolio
Figure 3.5 Renewable energy portfolio
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Renewable energy portfolio is defined as the ratio of renewable generation to total generation
∑ f itb x f i1tb
∑ f ihtb x f ihtb
. Neither C&T nor carbon tax policies explicitly targets on increasing renewable energy portfo-
lio, but the RPS policies established in more than thirty states in the U.S. do so in a mandatory manner.
Therefore, it is meaningful to examine the resulting renewable energy portfolio as a result of C&T or
carbon tax policies. This result also indicates the increased capacity of renewable generation. Figure
3.5 shows the renewable energy portfolios as functions of K1+K2+K3. This figure shows a close con-
nection with Figure 3.4, because the amount of actual emissions reflects to a great extent the installed
renewable generation capacity and thus renewable energy portfolio, with a negative correlation.
3.3.5 Total Generation
Figure 3.6 Total generation
Figure 3.6 shows the total generation in three periods as functions of K1+K2+K3. Total generation
is an estimate of electricity price, since the price is linear function of demand. Increasing generation
usually results in decreasing electricity price. In Figure 3.6, the total generation of all policies are closed
to others, and goes down as the emissions cap tightens, which means the electricity price gets higher.
The higher electricity price is to compensate the carbon tax payment or renewable energy investment.
The NTS stands out a little, because the subsidy policies in NTS promote more renewable energy than
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other policies. All the curves converge to 15,500 MW, which is also total generation in the baseline
case.
3.3.6 Gencos’ and Grid Owner’s Total Profit
Figure 3.7 Gencos’ and grid owner’s total profit
Gencos’ and grid owner’s total profit is defined as:
∑
f jtb
β t−1Lb[P0jtb−P0jtb/Q0jtb(∑
g
sg jtb)]s f jtb
− ∑
f ihtb
β t−1Lb(C f iht + taxiht)x f ihtb−∑
f iht
β t−1I f ih∆x f iht (3.38)
This value indicates the impact of environmental policies on market players and the potential percep-
tions and reactions from Gencos and grid owner. Results are shown in Figure 3.7, from which we have
the following findings:
• In NTS, Genco can earn some subsidy while produce renewable energy, thus NTS has the highest
profit.
• NT is less than NTS only. In NT, the tax is nonuniform. In some places, the tax is low and tax
payment is low, thus the profit is not reduced a lot.
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• Counter-intuitively, C&T, NTS and NT firstly increase when the emissions cap decreases. This is
because the Nash equilibrium in the case study is not Pareto optimal. The environmental policies
do not necessarily compromise economic benefits of Gencos and grid owner.
• UTn and C&T are less profitable than UT when the cap is low. Compared to C&T and UTn,
UT results in a higher investment cost in renewable generation, but Gencos also spend less on
emissions tax payment. the overall effect leads to more profit in UT.
3.3.7 Economic Welfare
Figure 3.8 Economic welfare
The economic welfare as the present value of consumer surplus, Gencos’ profits, grid owner’s profit,
and regulator’s tax income is formulated as :
∑
f jtb
β t−1Lb[P0jtbs f jtb−P0jtb/(2Q0jtb)(∑
g
s f jtb)2]
− ∑
f ihtb
β t−1LbC f ihtx f ihtb−∑
f iht
β t−1I f ih∆x f iht (3.39)
This criterion indicates the integrated economic impact of the environmental policies on general stake
holders of power systems. Results are shown in Figure 3.8, from which we can see that all policies
are very similar on this criterion, and the economic welfare follows the intuitive decreasing trend as the
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emissions tightens. This results could provide a quantitative estimate of the economic cost of imposing
an environmental policies. UT has the least economic welfare since it is the harshest policy. Combina-
tion of tax and subsidy policies will neutralize the final policies’ impacts on economic welfare, which
results in the most economic welfare for NTS.
3.3.8 Emissions Adjusted Economic Welfare
Figure 3.9 Emissions adjusted economic welfare
Complementary to economic welfare, the criterion of emissions adjusted economic welfare is de-
fined to subtract the cost of emissions from the economic welfare. The monetary cost of emissions is
hard to estimate, but it is more important to take into account the cost of emissions than knowing the
exact value. An arbitrary value of $1.0/ton is used in this case study. Results are shown in Figure 3.9.
We observe that NTS, UTn, NT and C&T still have similar relationship as in Figure 3.8 (because they
have the same actual emissions), but they all have an optimal adjusted welfare. UT results in higher op-
timal adjusted welfare than other policies, because it has the lowest amount of actual emissions, which
makes all the difference when cost of emissions is valued.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the effectiveness and efficiency of C&T and Carbon taxes by quantifying
their impacts on Genco’s generation expansion planning decisions in a competitive electricity market.
Our modeling approach has the following strengths:
• All C&T and carbon tax policies are modeled in a GEP framework, which is particularly suitable
for assessing the effectiveness of the policies in stimulating new investment in renewable energy.
• The GEP model has a multi-period planning time horizon, thus is able to analyze Gencos’ banking
behavior and market dynamics as emissions cap is tightened over time.
• A bilevel optimization model is used to design a carbon tax policy that will lead to the same
emissions cap as in C&T. This approach enables one to put the effectiveness of all policies side
by side and focus on the comparison of eight efficiency criteria.
From the numerical results of a 30-bus network case study, we could not claim a clear winner or
loser. All policies show their relative advantages and disadvantages with respect to different criteria.
Nevertheless, we gain some insights on the policies, as discussed in Section 3.3 and briefly summarized
below:
• C&T is similar to UTn and UT at different emissions cap ranges. The reason lies in the implicit
constraints that C&T only banks allowance if future carbon price is the same as current carbon
price. Therefore, C&T is similar to UT when there is banking allowance in all periods, and similar
to UTn when there is no banking allowance.
• Non-uniform incentive policies have the flexibility to impose different taxes or subsidies at dif-
ferent locations. As such, they have the potential to reduce unnecessary cost and lead to higher
total profit for Gencos and the grid owner. Moreover, a combination of taxes and subsidies could
be more efficient than using taxes alone.
• Contrary to NT, UT is meant to stay constant over the entire planning period. such requirement
makes it the highest tax policy, which leads to the least amount of actual emissions and the highest
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renewable energy portfolio. With appropriate cost of emissions, UT can leads to the highest
emissions adjusted economic welfare. UT also reduces the policy uncertainties for Gencos’ GEP.
Our research results and analysis have several notable caveat and limitations. We model Gencos’
strategic auction and trading behavior in C&T in an implicit manner and do not separately capture the
allowance market and energy market. We assume all market players have perfect information of each
other, and no uncertainties on the demand or supply side are considered. Restrictions on arbitrage of
emissions allowances are also ignored in the models. Limited by the computational complexity of the
models, our case study is conducted on 30-bus system, and solved to an acceptable level, but the results
can be generalized to larger and more complex energy systems. Future research should be directed to
address these limitations.
50
CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT STRATEGY ASSESSMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In preparation for submission to a journal paper
Yanyi He, Lizhi Wang and George Gross
ABSTRACT
Investment in new generation capacity is essential in order for the power system to provide reliable
and economical electricity to meet the growing demand. However, capacity investment is a long-term
process with numerous challenges. The emerging environmental policies play an important role in the
planning by imposing new constraints and mechanisms on the grid. Uncertainty from various sources,
such as intermittency of renewable resources, and investment decisions made by other market partici-
pants, also makes the risk and return hard to measure.
We develop a new modeling framework to facilitate investment decision making with explicit con-
sideration of environmental regulations and uncertainty. This methodology is able to project the prof-
itability and risk of different investing plans over the next couple of decades. The modeling framework
has a three-layer structure. The top layer, called the optimization layer, is the interface with the decision
maker and the framework, which compares a set of candidate investment plans against a set of deci-
sion market optimization philosophies and preferred risk-and-return tradeoff criteria. The middle layer,
called the assessment layer, backs up the optimization layer with a comprehensive assessment of each
plan using both probabilistic and scenario analysis, providing suggestions on potential improvement.
The bottom layer, called the operations layer, is the computational engine of the framework to compute
deterministic DC optimal power flows (OPF) for the whole planning horizon.
We demonstrate the advantages of our modeling framework by using a representative case study of
the 240-bus WECC test system. Results with proper visualization reveal insightful consequences of an
investment plan, which in turn helps decision makers to identify directions of potential improvement
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and come up with better investment plans.
4.1 Introduction
The push toward a cleaner and more sustainable environment is bringing new pressures on the
electric power industry. The numerous fossil fired power plants that operate today create the largest
source of stationary carbon dioxide (CO2) emitters. There are many climate change initiatives, in
various stages of development, whose implementation will strongly influence the future course of the
industry and consequently the entire nature of electricity planning and future operations. The various
initiatives aim to reduce the environmental footprint of the electricity sector and will entail fundamental
changes in the way power systems operate, the role electricity customers play and the scope and nature
of future resource investments. In The restructured competitive environment, in distinct contrast to
that of the vertically integrated utility industry, the generation and transmission planning decisions are
undertaken by different entities on an increasingly decentralized basis. Such decisions are subject to the
constraints imposed by the existing climate change initiatives, a patchwork of mandates, incentives and
voluntary programs – each with its distinct targets and goals. These developments impact the planning
environment significantly since they introduce various additional sources of uncertainty that further
complicate the investment decision-making process.
The basic objective is to study the formulation and solution of investment decisions in new genera-
tion resources that are compliant with the requirements of environmental policies and explicitly consider
their attendant uncertainty. Environmental policies take various forms and influence resource invest-
ment decisions in different ways. For example, the creation of renewable portfolio standards (RPS),
which requires a specified fraction of the load and/or energy be supplied by renewable resources by a
defined date, has resulted in the growing push to implement renewable energy projects at deeper pene-
trations. Other legislative acts, such as a carbon tax, the provision of production/investment tax credits
and the implementation of time-of-use pricing, create incentives for compliance with policy goals but
need not mandate such actions. The legislatively improved introduction of a carbon cap-and-trade
mechanism and the use of renewable energy certificates via legislation sets up new markets to imple-
ment a flexible structure for meeting the goals of reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Such structures
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provide individual power producers the flexibility to trade emissions allowances among themselves and
provide incentives to some to install improved abatement technology. The policies, be they mandates
or voluntary or market-based, have a large influence on planning decisions. They may create unparal-
leled opportunities for the investment in renewable resources or may force the resource owners to create
cleaner generation sources than ever before. Moreover, they create new opportunities and challenges
in the planning and operations of the power systems and in the effective investment decision-making
process.
A salient feature is the need to explicitly consider the broad range of uncertainty associated with the
repercussions and ramifications of such environmental policies. Such consideration is very important
in the framing of investment decisions and results in the addition of complications to what is already a
very complex decision-making process.
We devote the remainder of this section to setting the context within which our work is developed,
provide a brief survey of the state of the art and delineate the key requirements for the methodology.
4.1.1 Need for Additional Investments in the Era of New Environmental Legislation
Electricity demand is expected to grow continually and steadily for decades to come. In the EIA
Annual Energy Outlook 2013, forecasts indicate that electricity consumption will increase by 28% from
2011 to 2040 at approximately a 1% per annum rate [15]. To accommodate such growth in electricity
demand, new capacity of electricity generation must be built at a pace that meets or exceeds the growth
of demand and retirement of old generators to maintain power system reliability. The additions of
capacity must be done in such a way that the reliability of the power systems is appropriately maintained.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) considers reliability to consist of the
system adequacy – the condition that sufficient resources are installed to provide customers with a con-
tinuous supply of electricity to meet their demands and security – the ability of the bulk power systems
to withstand sudden, unexpected disturbances. A prerequisite for adequacy and security is that the sys-
tem has available capacity at all times which exceeds the demand. The assurance of reliability becomes
considerably complicated in the era where many new requirements must be met as a result of new
legislation and regulatory initiatives and decisions. We next review the nature of these requirements.
Numerous environmental regulations have been imposed on the electric power industry, which was
53
responsible for 33% of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. in 2011 [11]. Such regulations have
imposed additional considerations, which need to be taken into account by investment decisions makers.
The following section discusses the requirements of four representative regulations and policies that
impact investment decisions.
Production tax credit: PTC is incentive provided by the federal government in the form of tax credits
for one MWh of renewable energy delivered to the grid. Such credits decreases the tax obligations
of the renewable generator owners, which serves as a subsidy to renewable generator investment
costs [8]. It was initiated in 1992 in the U.S, which sometimes are not provided due to prevailing
political presences.
Cap-and-trade This regulation constrains the aggregate emissions of polluting electricity generation
resources. The limit or cap is either administratively allotted or sold via an auction to generator
owners in the form of permits or allowances to emit or discharge specified amount of pollutants.
The number of allowances represents the required cap on a pollutant. Any violation of emissions
beyond the allowances is subject to penalty. Excess allowances may be banked, used to offset
pollution emissions of other facilities, or traded in markets of emission allowances. The expenses
of emission allowances introduce additional costs of the energy by polluting resources. The
cap-and-trade policy imposes limits on the production quantity as well as price competitiveness
of generation from polluting resources, and the introduced emission markets lead to additional
complexity of strategic decision-makings. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) [51] is the
largest voluntary CO2 cap-and-trade program in the U.S., with nine states involved. California
started its own CO2 cap-and-trade program in December 2012 [1].
Carbon tax A tax is imposed on the CO2 content of fuels used for producing energy and other pro-
ductions so as to explicitly represent the costs of the emissions by a polluting generation unit.
Compared to the cap-and-trade policy, the carbon tax is determined by legislative agencies, by-
passing the need to set up new market structure. Many economists believe such a tax to be an
efficient means for CO2 reduction. The carbon tax policy has been implemented in some coun-
tries like Switzerland and Australia, but has not been adopted by large carbon-based electricity
generation nations such as America or China.
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Renewable Portfolio Standards The standards specify minimal renewable generation targets to be
provided by renewable resources by prescribed dates [12]. Such standards impose these obli-
gations on electricity supply entities, such as investor-owned utilities and electricity service
providers. Qualified renewable energy production may earn certificates for every unit of elec-
tricity injected into the grid that indicates compliance with the obligations. The compliance with
RPS relies on the competition in the energy markets and the efficiency of transmission networks.
Therefore, more price competitions will be stimulated between different types of renewable en-
ergy. This policy encourages the development of cost-competitive renewable technologies and
the investment of pathways to transmit increased renewable generations. Renewable and alterna-
tive energy portfolio standards have been mandatorily or voluntarily established in 38 states in
the U.S and the District of Columbia by 2013.
The thrust of numerous environmental legislation efforts is to either directly restrain the pollu-
tant emissions or to promote investments into new renewable technology projects so as to satisfy RPS
requirements. As electricity demand grows continually, renewable generation to meet load must be in-
creased commensurately. There are various other regulating mechanisms, such as feed-in-tariffs for the
purchase of excess renewable energy injections by residential or small commercial customers to further
promote these objectives. The ultimate goal goes beyond the reduction of emissions and the deeper
penetration of generation resources into the grid to make the future power grid a sustainable system to
meet future customers’ energy requirements.
The compliance with environmental policies imposes requirements in the planning of future sys-
tems. Under environmental policies, generation companies must either retire much of the coal-fired
generation resources or make large investments in pollution abatement technology. However, invest-
ment in renewable generation projects, with their large amounts of capital and land requirements, may
be attractive alternatives. The deeper penetration by renewable resources poses daunting challenges
to managing the intermittency and variability nature of the outputs and the integration issues with the
provision of ancillary services. In addition, the expansion of the transmission grid to assure the deliv-
erability to the grid of the added renewable generation is a critically important challenge that must be
explicitly considered in the planning framework. Clearly, the requirements imposed by environmen-
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tal legislations introduce many new complications into planning. Moreover, the enactment of future
environmental legislation and the introduction of new regulatory initiatives are difficult to predict ac-
curately and are subject to a wide range of uncertainty sources. Such uncertainty must be considered
in the planning and investment decision-making. The following section discusses additional sources of
uncertainty and their categorizations.
4.1.2 Sources of Uncertainty
Planning, by its nature, deals with the uncertain future. The uncertainty arises from the statuses
of operating elements, as well as unpredictable human factors of the energy regulators, producers and
consumers. We classify all the sources of uncertainty into the categories of aleatoric and epistemic
uncertainty [62], and use different approaches to deal with them.
Aleatoric uncertainty is intrinsically random and cannot be eliminated or reduced through more
accurate measurements. However, the uncertainty is statistically quantifiable. Therefore, aleatoric un-
certainty is also known as statistical uncertainty. For instance, wind speed uncertainty is aleatoric, be-
cause each measurement of wind speed at a given location at a given time point is physically obtainable.
Moreover, the average wind speed may be statistically estimated from all the collected measurements.
Other examples of aleatoric uncertainty that are relevant to the investment decision-making process
include electricity demand, both short-and-long term, power outputs from renewable energy sources,
forced outages of generation units and transmission lines, weather conditions and the economic situa-
tion.
Epistemic uncertainty arises from factors we may know but, in practice, we do not. Specific rea-
sons for such uncertainty may be because we cannot measure with sufficient accuracy, or the information
is kept confidential. Therefore, epistemic uncertainty is also known as systematic uncertainty. For in-
stance, the generation investment decisions of other firms constitute confidential information and so the
probabilities associated with such decisions are unknown. Thus, their investment decisions constitute
an epistemic uncertainty. Other examples of epistemic uncertainty that are relevant to the investment
decision-making process include government policies, technology breakthroughs, economic conditions
and investment decisions made by other entities.
This classification of uncertainty sources is useful as it helps us to determine the approach to deploy
56
for probabilistic risk assessment and to collect the appropriate data. For epistemic sources of uncer-
tainty, we identify meaningful scenarios under which we assess both the likely and the high-impact
realizations of uncertainty. For aleatoric sources of uncertainty, we approximate their cumulative distri-
bution functions (c.d.f.s) from past data and use probabilistic methods to estimate the expected values
of the metrics of interest. Investment decisions are not only affected by the uncertainty, but also the
resources and technology development.
4.1.3 Resource Characteristics and Investment Decisions
This section provides a brief review of supply-and demand-side resource considerations in invest-
ment decisions. The investment decisions in the case study are made in the context of the existing power
systems. As such, in undertaking every investment decision, the salient characteristics of supply and de-
mand resources and the interactions of each resource with the existing resource mix must be explicitly
considered.
Table 4.1 provides a listing of the key economic advantages and disadvantages of some com-
mon generation technologies. The analysis of resource alternatives requires careful weighting of the
investment-fixed-and operation-variable-costs of a resource. Compared to renewable resources, the
operation costs of fossil-fuel-fired generation are high and increase under both a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade policy. Carbon sequestration technology can reduce the carbon emissions, but entails additional
investment costs for the retrofit. Investors can choose to either retire or retrofit an existing fossil-fuel-
fired generator. In the light of environmental policies, gas-fired generators and renewable generators
are key expansion alternatives in the next decade. Gas-fired generation has lower emission rate than
fossil-fuel-fired units such as coal-fired and distilled oil units and the current glut in low price gas
supplies makes gas-fired resources a viable investment alternative. Renewable resources entail con-
siderable upfront investments and typically, have large area requirements for their installations. Their
highly uncertain variability and intermittency nature is a key disadvantage. The available rebates and
PTCs lighten the costs and their extremely low or zero fuel costs are advantages. The cost of wind and
other technologies has been steeply brought down over the last few years. For example, PV costs have
declined steeply in the past two years [9]. Actually, the levelized costs of the same renewable technol-
ogy may vary at different locations due to state and local policies, land costs and other factors. Storage
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Table 4.1 Brief economic comparisons of technology
Technology Advantages Disadvantages
OTEC renewable resources; long life times; zero
fuel cost
extremely high investment costs;
low capacity factor
IBGCC low CO2 emissions; high efficiency;long
life times
no significant drawbacks
nuclear zero emissions; high efficiency long lead times; nuclear waste issue
NGCC high efficiency; constant output moderate emissions
oil high efficiency; constant output very high operations cost, intensive
emissions
solar PV renewable resources large land requirements
geothermal renewable resources; very long life times high investment cost
solar thermal renewable resources; possible 24-h supply
source
heavy water usage requirements
MSW renewable resources; waste-to-energy; re-
duces needs for landfills
high operational costs
hydro renewable resources; low operations costs scheduling complexity
onshore wind renewable resources; zero operations cost require large land
offshore wind renewable resources high investment cost; longer lead
time
IGCC high efficiency output high emission rate; high operations
cost
wave Power renewable resources; predictable output high investment cost
technology has the ability to smooth the fluctuations of intermittent energy [35, 58, 65]. Storage acts
symbiotically with renewable intermittent generation and can be an effective coupling to manage the
intermittency issues.
In addition to supply-side alternatives, demand has considerable promise. The Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission defines demand response (DR) as “changes in electric usage by end-use customers
from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or
to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices
or when system reliability is jeopardized [64].” The effective deployment of DR resources is a topic of
wide current interests.
Selective common technologies are considered as our investment candidates by weighting the cons,
pros and trade-offs of the technologies in the markets, reliability, and compliance with environmental
policy requirements in the case study.
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4.1.4 Review of the Literature
There is a rich body of literature on investment decision-making in power systems, including gener-
ation expansion and transmission expansion. In past publications, each has a specific focus and address
certain challenges of the investment problem. The literature of highest relevance in the mathematical
programming also listed approaches to solutions of investment problems. We compare the literature
from the perspectives of the comprehensiveness of the formulation, consideration of uncertainty, solu-
tion approach and computational tractability, and discuss their contributions and deficiencies along with
the perspectives.
• Linares et al. in [60] studied oligopolists generation expansion planning Nash equilibrium in the
markets, explicitly considering energy, emission trading and green energy certificates markets. It
is the first model to incorporate three markets and solve their equilibria simultaneously. Energy
prices increase with the introduction of certificates market, and can be compensated by emissions
markets. However, in the real world, it is unlikely to obtain perfect information of the plan-
ning environment to achieve Nash equilibrium. The model is also static, and lacks uncertainty
consideration.
• Bakirtzis et al. in [21] considered three types of time lengths in the model – short-term operations,
mid-term scheduling decisions and long-term cost-minimization planning in a vertical market
structure. The environmental considerations were presented as costs of allowances and penalties.
A real Greek power system was tested to illustrate effects of demand, fuel prices and CO2 prices
uncertainty on the planning decisions. The model had a good granularity on describing the power
system, however, it did not address the competition among investors.
• Jin et al. in [52] integrated transmission expansion, generation expansion and pool-based market
operations in the framework by constructing a three-level mixed integer problem to represent the
panning and operations relationships among the entities. The transmission expansion planning
was done by the system regulator at the upper level, subject to the Nash equilibrium of generation
capacity expansion at intermediate level and equilibrium of the pool market at the lower level. The
authors proposed a hybrid algorithm to solve the case study with a large testing system. Regarding
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the formulation and associated computational issue, it is difficult to consider uncertainty under
the authors’ framework.
• Roh et al. in [69] studied the competitions and interactions among generation and transmission
companies under uncertainty. The companies are regulated by the ISO to maximize their ex-
pected profits under uncertainty. The authors solved the problem by using a proposed iterative
process. The iterative process is applicable to models with multiple decision makers. The profit
maximization model of Trancos is debatable. ISO prefers to maximize the social welfare, while
this model has a high probability to lose the social welfare.
• Tekiner et al. in [74] computed the Pareto front of expected values of system cost and air emis-
sions for a multi-period long-term generation expansion planning under uncertainty of demand
and distribution line outages. The Pareto front was equivalent to the sensitivity analysis of carbon
prices. With growing concerns on the environment (increasing carbon prices), investment cost
was not a big hindrance to renewable investment. The case study was limited to a few periods
with load blacks and does not delineate the oligopoly nature in the energy market.
• He et al. [44] compared the applications of the carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies in a genera-
tion expansion background. They found the impacts of the carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies
to be equivalent to some extent, by comparing the effectiveness like social welfare, carbon taxes,
allowance prices, and profits. The formulation in [44] was not extendable to large-scaled cases,
and failed to show more insights of generation planning with various technology options.
• Zhou et al. in [83] studied a centralized generation investor’s expansion strategies under RPS
and subsidies policies, subject to fuel transportation. The goal of the authors was to achieve the
effective and efficient subsidy or tax policy to meet the prescribed RPS, the sensitivity analysis
of policy prices with respect to fuel prices, renewable technology investment costs, and trans-
mission capacity. It provided insights of designing incentive policies in promoting renewable
technologies.[83] emphasized on policy design and lost precision of modeling generation com-
panies.
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Table 4.2 summarizes the literature with respect to different perspectives. Literature emphasized
different characteristics in their studies and let go of others. None of the literature is good in all perspec-
tives. For example, most of the previous works bring down the granularity for the long-term planning.
Epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties are not addressed at the same time. Some of the models are too
complex to extend, such as mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints.
In our work, which is called “M-28”, we try to make some improvements with tradeoffs among the
characteristics. We would consider hourly load patterns in the operations, transmission network, envi-
ronmental policies like renewable portfolio standards and carbon tax, strategic behavior, and different
sources of uncertainty.
4.1.5 Contributions
M-28 is structured to directly address the deficiencies identified in the previous section. In M-28, we
propose a new framework for investment planning in power systems that have relatively high resolutions
of details in power system operations (such as hourly load patterns, temporal and spatial correlation of
renewable energy and demand). We take the profit maximization from the perspective of an indepen-
dent generation investor who explicitly incorporates environmental policy requirements. To avoid the
assumption of complete information, the entities’ strategic behaviors in the competitive energy market
are modeled as a source of uncertainty. Categorizations of uncertainty enable both probabilistic analysis
and scenario analysis of the investment decisions. M-28 provides the decision maker with a range of
optimization criteria to accommodate different return and risk measures, and risk tolerance attitudes or
preferences. The investment candidates are assessed carefully by computing all the metrics of interest
to provide quantification of the impacts of environmental regulation requirements and other sources of
uncertainty. The results are potentially helpful for decision makers to make potential improvements
toward better investment plans. The framework is able to deploy a computational engine capable of
application to realistically sized large-scale grids.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. We provide a detailed description of the modeling
framework in Section 4.2, including functions and coordination mechanism on the proposed layers.
Section 4.3 reports the results of our representative case study using the 240-bus WECC model. The
case study illustrates the ability of our framework to assess effectively various investment candidates
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under different sensitivity cases. We provide concluding remarks in Section 4.4 that summarizes over
key findings and conclusions. We also discuss directions for future work in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
includes the framework formulations, and assumptions and parameters used in the case study.
4.2 Modeling Framework
Optimization layer
Candidate
plans
?
Quantitative
assessment
6
Assessment layer
OPF
outcome
?
Selection
of scenarios
6
Operations layer
Figure 4.1 Framework
The framework is designed to answer two fundamental questions: for a given investment plan, how
does one assess its effectiveness and second, for a given set of investment plans, how to compare their
relative effectiveness. We take the perspective of a specific generation company, which we refer to
as the investing generation company, or iGENCO. The objective of the framework is to maximize the
present value of the total profit of iGENCO over a given planning period (such as 20 years). The profit
consists of revenue from sales of energy and tax credits less investment cost and operations cost. All
the revenue and cost terms are converted to the first year of planning to account for the time value of
money. To address these two questions, our new framework is designed to consist of three layers, as
shown in Figure 4.1:
• The top layer, which is the interface between the model and the investment decision maker, is the
optimization layer. This layer takes a set of candidate investment plans from the decision maker
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and compares their relative profitability with respect to a pre-determined set of criteria. This layer
addresses the second fundamental question.
• The middle layer is the assessment layer, which is given an investment plan, epistemic scenarios
and probability distributions of aleatoric uncertainty, and provides a quantitative assessment with
explicit consideration of uncertainty. This layer addresses the first fundamental question.
• The bottom layer is the operations layer, which solves an OPF problem and returns market out-
comes for a given set of network configuration under a scenario realization. This layer is a
computational engine of the modeling framework.
This framework has the following salient features:
Modeling granularity Several details of power systems are incorporated, such as load pattern, tempo-
ral and spatial correlation of renewable energy, and hourly optimal power flow.
Policy We model the effect of policy by adjusting cost parameters. For example, the production tax
credits will reduce the variable cost of renewable energy generation, whereas a carbon tax will
increase it.
Transmission Transmission network and expansion is included in the modeling to address the topology
impacts on the energy delivery and generation planning. The transmission network is invested
and regulated by the system operator.
Market The market is liberalized energy market with oligopoly generating companies. The strategic
behavior of rival generating companies in the market is not directly modeled; rather it is treated
as a source of epistemic uncertainty.
Uncertainty We adopt the categorization of aleatoric and epistemic sources of uncertainty and use
different approaches to deal with the two types. For aleatoric uncertainty, probability density
functions of random variables are assumed to be known, and we apply probabilistic analysis to
quantify the impacts of such uncertainty. For epistemic uncertainty, sets of relevant scenarios are
assumed to be predetermined and we use scenario analysis to determine their impacts.
Computation We use linear approximated DC power flows to formulate the energy market.
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Details of the three-layer modeling framework are presented in subsequent subsections.
4.2.1 Optimization Layer
The optimization layer, which is the interface with the decision maker, compares multiple candidate
investment plans against a given set of optimization criteria. The inputs to this layer include a list of
candidate investment plans and a set of optimization criteria. These inputs are provided by the invest-
ment decision maker. The outputs of this layer are a set of quantitative measures of all the candidate
investment plans against the criteria. The output information will help the decision maker to compare
the risk and return of multiple investment alternatives against various measures.
The following are several commonly used optimization criteria:
Expected profit is probability weighted average profit over all the scenarios. This is a common crite-
rion for risk neutral decision makers. A major challenge is probability assignment to epistemic
scenarios. Since no historical data are available to estimate such probabilities, subjective judg-
ment will be used.
Standard deviation of profit measures the risk of the uncertain profit. The combination of expected
value and standard deviation is commonly used to determine the tradeoff between return and
risk of an investment. Projects with higher returns (expected profits) and lower risk (standard
deviations) are considered more desirable than those with lower return and higher risk. The
tradeoff between higher return with higher risk and lower return with lower risk is up to the risk
tolerance, investment style, and personality of the decision maker.
Worse case profit is the minimal profit under all scenarios. This is a pessimistic risk measure for
conservative decision makers. Similar philosophies have been used in robust optimization, in
which the optimal solution is defined as the one resulting in the highest benefit under the worst
case scenario.
Best case profit is the maximal profit under uncertainty, the exact opposite criterion with the worse
case profit. This is an optimistic risk measure for risk-seeking decision makers.
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Expected regret is the probability weighted average regret under aleatoric uncertainty. For a invest-
ment plan p1 with profit pi(p1,s0), the regret associated with this investment plan is defined as
the maximal possible profit loss with respect to all possible investment plans:
maxp{r(p1, p,s0)}= maxp{pi(p,s0)}−pi(p1,s0).
Intuitively, the smaller the expected regret, the more likely the decision maker feels good about
the selected investment plan under uncertainty
4.2.2 Assessment Layer
The assessment layer computes approximate probability distributions of a firm’s profit over the plan-
ning horizon for a given investment plan. Inputs to the assessment layer include an investment plan, a
set of scenarios for epistemic uncertainty, and a set of probability density functions for aleatoric uncer-
tainty. The investment plan is passed down from the optimization layer, which uses the assessment layer
as a sub-routine to assess all the investment candidates individually before it conducts a comparative
analysis. The set of scenarios for epistemic uncertainty and a set of probability density functions for
aleatoric uncertainty are assumed to be provided in the optimization layer.
The input epistemic uncertainty scenarios are subjectively selected in the optimization layer by the
investment decision maker to reflect what they perceive as possible, and critical scenarios. The aleatoric
uncertainty is assumed to be statistically characterizable using historical data. We assume that statistical
characterization of the aleatoric uncertain parameters has been conducted and is readily available to the
assessment layer. The outputs from the assessment layer are in the form of several quantitative indicators
listed as follows:
Profit capacity ratio calculates the generator’s average profit per capacity over the planning horizon.
The higher the ratio, the more profitability potential for further investment. This ratio helps
decision maker to identify opportunities for better investment alternatives.
Annual profit distribution illustrates the probability density function of iGENCO’s annual profit. The
trajectory of such distributions over the entire planning horizon provides a convenient perspective
to the company’s profit outlook.
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Emissions indicate the environmental footprint of an investment plan. This value provides both an
explanation for reward or penalty imposed by environmental regulations but also a projection of
future reward or penalty as a result of potential policy changes.
Renewable generation portfolio measures the ratio of renewable electricity generation to total elec-
tricity generation from iGENCO. This is a similar indicator to total emissions.
Load curtailment is the total amount of energy-not-served due to inefficient transmission or lack of
generation capability. This is a good indicator of the power system’s generation adequacy and
reliability.
System profit is the total profit earned by all the generation companies in the power systems. This pro-
vides a comparative benchmark for iGENCO to evaluate its profitability against its competitors.
These assessment indicators not only provide the investing decision maker with a comprehensive
assessment of the investment plans, but also shed light on directions of potential improvement.
4.2.3 Operations Layer
The operations layer is a computational engine that solves a deterministic OPF for the entire plan-
ning horizon. Input parameters to the operations layer include transmission/generation capacity and
availability, generators’ supply function, deterministic fixed load, carbon taxes or credits, etc. These
parameters are passed down from the assessment layer. The outputs of the operations layer are a sam-
ple path of the OPF solutions, which feed back to the assessment layer. The sample path includes
information such as hourly dispatched generations, local marginal prices and the power flows under a
given scenario path through the whole planning horizon. The OPF formulation of the operations layer
includes the Kirchhoff Current and Voltage Laws, capacity constraints, and implementations of envi-
ronmental policies. The detailed formulation and assumptions of the operations layer are provided in
Section 4.5.1.
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4.3 Case Study
Our framework is examined on a realistic network with elaborately designed investment plans and
representative epistemic scenarios. The planning horizon is set to be twenty years. Several investment
plans are designed to answer questions raised in generation expansion planning, such as when and
where to install how much capacity. The epistemic scenarios are deliberately selected to represent a
subjective generation planning environment, such as through implementation of regulations and trans-
mission planning. Other details in the case study, such as fuel prices and load growth rate are practically
defined. The case study is able to return reliable results to assess the long-term planning strategies for
iGENCO in the future. Section 4.3.1 is the introduction to the test system. Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 list
the selective epistemic scenarios and investment plans. Section 4.3.4 illustrates the case study results.
4.3.1 Test System
We use the reduced WECC (Western Electricity Coordinating Council) 240-bus network as our test
system. The 240-bus test system was developed by California Independent System Operators (CAISO)
to use as a market design prototype [68]. It can be used as a realistic test system for California and
WECC market. The 240-bus network evolved from previous 225-bus network by conforming topology
of areas outside CAISO shown in other transmission studies. The 225-bus network evolved from a
179-bus network by conforming topologies of CAISO shown in other transmission studies. There are
138 buses within CAISO excluding HOOVER. The network is enclosed, and no energy is transmitted in
and out of the system, which means the facilities like power plants and transmission lines are all located
within the system. The market comprises the whole network and is assumed to be regulated by a single
virtual regulator in our case study.
Figure 4.2 is the topology of the WECC network. Thick solid lines represent connections between
the CAISO and neighboring, and significant transmission lines within CAISO. The shaded blocks are
the areas under CAISO regulations. Each bus shown in the topology could have multiple sub-buses with
various voltages. It is worthy to mention that the topology does not represent the physical geometry.
The resource characteristics inherited from [68] are listed in Section 4.5.2.1.
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Figure 4.2 WECC 240-bus topology
4.3.2 Scenarios in Epistemic and Aleatoric Uncertainty
The hypotheses of epistemic scenarios are based on knowledge and information of the power sys-
tems, energy markets, political systems, economy, and federal and state laws or regulations. Therefore,
the epistemic scenarios are inexhaustible and difficult to constitute. As a matter of fact, it takes 1,000
minutes to complete the assessment of one investment plan under one epistemic scenario, which al-
lows for consideration of only a small number of investment candidates, each with a small number of
epistemic scenarios. Moreover, some scenarios barely occur and are not worth addressing in the study.
4.3.2.1 Selection of Epistemic Scenarios
Although epistemic uncertainty is unknown in practice, it can be subjectively, but rationally and
logically constituted through public reports, research and experience. We consider competitor decisions,
transmission plans and implementation of environmental regulations in epistemic scenarios.
Expansion decisions of other generation companies are fabricated via guessing generation com-
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panies’ investment preference. Some generator companies, who only have non-renewable generators,
would be more likely to invest in renewable generators only. Some generator companies, who have ex-
isting coal power plants, would be likely to invest in gas-fired power plants to replace the high emission
coal power plants and keep their reserve capability. The total investment capacity is commensurate with
generator company current capacity.
Generation expansion depends on future pathways; at the same time, transmission expansion relies
on locations of generators. Although there are debates between the causality or consequence between
transmission expansion and generation expansion, it is agreed that one heavily influences the other.
We assume the market regulator does transmission planning and pays the transmission investment cost,
and the specific amount would not be discussed in the case study. Both transmission and generation
expansion are estimated empirically and follow the rules in Section 4.5.3.1.
The epistemic scenarios also address the most probable environment policies during the generation
planning.
The descriptions of the four selective epistemic scenarios are presented as follows:
S0 All the generation companies except CDWR (who has large hydro only and excluding iGENCO
could have more than 30% but less than 40% renewable generations to produce in the end of the
planning time frame, if all their generators are at the maximal outputs. The transmission network
in this scenario has 122 new transmission lines, which are built through the planning horizon.
No explicit environmental policy is imposed. We take this transmission network as the baseline
transmission network and this scenario as baseline scenario.
Sc A carbon tax policy is imposed on the power systems from year 9 to year 20 in the planning horizon.
The carbon tax simply remains constant within a year. The carbon prices are predetermined
by the equation: (13+ 2(year− 1)) ∗ (1.052(year-1)). Other conditions such as the generation
companies’(excluding iGENCO) investment decisions and transmission network stay the same
as the baseline scenario.
St A new transmission planning replaces the one in the baseline scenario. The investments of all the
generation companies (excluding iGENCO) are the same as the baseline scenario. No environ-
mental policy is imposed.
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Sgc All the generation companies except CDWR (who has large hydro only) and excluding iGENCO
could have more than 40% renewable generations to produce in the end of the planning time
frame, if all their generators are at the maximal outputs. We also keep imposing the carbon tax
policy as described under St . The transmission network is the same as the baseline transmission
network.
The baseline scenario aims to describe a moderate planning environment. Generation companies
are around the boundaries of complying with preexisting policy – 33% RPS by 2020 and generally keep
increasing renewable generation portfolio.
Sc is used to observe the impacts of environmental regulations. The choice of the carbon tax policy
is based on the cap-and-trade program in California, which was launched in 2012 [1]. The carbon
price started to be 10$/ton, became 14$/ton in early 2013 and is forecasted to reach 75$/ton in 2020
[4, 2, 46]. To simplify the modeling, the CO2 auction mechanism is not mathematically modeled. The
carbon price in 2020 under this scenario is slightly lower than the forecasting, since when the renewable
generation grows up, the needs of carbon will decline, and the carbon price might be smaller than the
forecasted value [44].
Under St , we intend to study the impacts of transmission lines on the generation expansion. The
new network is intentionally designed to significantly reduce peak-hour LMPs under Plan A.
Sgc is designed to observe the market outcomes when other generation companies are optimistic
about renewable technology. A renewable generator with cheap operation cost is likely to enter into
the market every hour, and earn more profit. For some given hours, generation companies may pro-
duce less electricity due to intermittency of renewable resources. Thus, generation companies with
more non-intermittent nonrenewable technologies may be able to provide electricity supply and be-
come competitive in the market. LMPs are usually high during those hours, and generation companies
with a significant nonrenewable energy supply may be profitable due to intermittency. It is quite in-
teresting to study the investment strategies when the outer environment is ambitious and confident in
renewable technologies. It makes more sense to have implementation of a mandatory policy if the
majority believes in renewable technologies. Thus, the carbon tax policy is implemented.
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4.3.2.2 Makeup of Aleatoric Scenarios
Distribution fitting models are built upon the features of the uncertainty. For example, generator
outage is usually modeled as binomial distribution. Among renewable resources, wind is mostly studied.
Peer literatures showed that Weibull distribution was widely to model wind speed [26, 42, 61, 76].
Brownie motion and time series method were also used to model wind uncertainty [27, 28, 55]. In order
to acquire robust and reliable fitting parameters, a large data set is required to simulate the distribution.
Wind outputs are both temporally and spatially correlated. Moreover, the electricity demand and
the wind output are correlated as well. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a suitable fitting distribution
fundamentally. Additionally, due to the limitation of the data, we are not able to fit the distribution via
statistical approaches. As a consequence, we manipulate the existing data and generate a set of reason-
able aleatoric scenarios. In the data file, we have only one year hourly time-varying electricity loads
and generations. The outputs themselves must follow certain distributions if any exist. Therefore, the
complex correlations discussed before have been reflected in the outputs. In the case study, renewable
generation and electricity demand uncertainty are considered in the aleatoric uncertainty. The aleatoric
scenarios used in the case study are made up through the process described in Section 4.5.3.2. Decision
makers are welcome to use their own scenario generation methods and apply to our framework. The
framework’s applicability is independent of the scenario generation methodologies.
4.3.3 Candidate Investment Plans
California RPS program requires investor-owned utilities (IOU), electric service providers, and
community choice aggregations to increase procurement from eligible renewable energy resources to
33% of total procurement by 2020 [3]. It is one of the most ambitious RPS in the United States. Cur-
rently, California’s three large IOUs reached 19.9% renewable power in 2012. Pacific Gas and Electric
(PG&E) served 19.3%, San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) served 20.3% and Southern California
Edison (SCE) served 20.6 % under their own generation portfolios. Therefore, renewable energy invest-
ment is the priority among all investment options. To keep the system’s reliability and reserve capacity,
nonrenewable generator investments are also inevitable in the long-term planning.
Generally, generation companies need to consider both environmental factors and their own condi-
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tions to make smart investment choices. Generation companies look at their current generator portfolios
and estimate their financial conditions, and are also supposed to have rational suppositions on other gen-
eration companies’ strategic behaviors. The profitability of investments is restricted by investments of
other generation companies.
We select the largest generation company in the data set as iGENCO for our case study. Although it
resembles PG&E, our case study results do not necessarily reflect any reality with the company, since
numerical results from our case study are obtained using various assumptions. iGENCO is assumed
to have rational and reasonable perceptions of other market players’ decision-making on investments
and operations, based on analysis of available public reports. All the generation companies follow the
generator expansion rules listed in Section 4.5.3.1. The following lists the five selective investment
plans in the case study:
Plan A iGENCO has about 32.8% renewable generations to produce if all its generators are at the
maximal outputs in the end of the planning time frame. All the types of possible technologies
are invested in with appropriate capacities according to historical data at the proper time. For
example, geothermal and biomass generators are unlikely assigned with high capacities.
Plan B iGENCO can have about 50% renewable generation to produce if every generator is at its
maximal output in the end of the planning time frame. New renewable generators in Plan A
scale up their installed capacities, while new nonrenewable generators scale down their installed
capacities. The total generation in the end of the planning time frame keeps almost the same
compared to Plan A, if generators operate at their maximal outputs.
Plan C All the invested generators in Plan A are brought forward one year ahead.
Plan D New renewable generators are all switched to wind generators with comparable total generation
outputs, and installed in possible locations under the expansion rules.
Plan E New generators in Plan A are switched locations arbitrarily without violating the expansion
rules.
Plan A is also called the baseline investment plan. iGENCO does moderate investments in all
possible generator technologies.
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Plan B is designed to observe the renewable generation profitability. This plan answers the question
of how much to invest in renewable generations. The renewable generators is not cost competitive
with regards to the investment cost, but inversely very economic with respect to the operations cost.
Thus, the renewable generations are easier to get accepted in energy markets. At the same time, cheap
electricity supply from renewable generations has a locational marginal price (LMP) reduction effect,
and the profit might not be higher as expectation. There lie in other issues due to the uncertainty of
the renewable generations as well. The profit variance is likely to increase, and the investment plan’s
robustness will likely decrease.
Plan C is selected to study the question of when to invest. Earlier investment comes with earlier
earnings. With regard to the time value of money, it seems more worthy to make earlier investment.
However, generators are depreciated earlier and lose profits in the future. This plan helps analyze the
tradeoffs.
Plan D is designed to study the technology options and mix of investments. Different types of
technology have their own advantages. For example, biomass generators are expensive, but supply
stably; wind generators are cheap, but supply low during the daytime when the load is high. We examine
the impacts of the technology selections by extremely switching all the renewable technologies to wind.
Plan E is aimed to study the locational impacts of new generators. Generally speaking, investments
in high LMP buses look promising to earn higher revenue. However, if other generation companies
perceive the business opportunity and invest in the same buses, LMPs might be reduced and hence the
revenue, or iGENCO loses market share due to cost competency.
A “case” is defined as one plan under an epistemic scenario. There are twenty cases in total to
show us the impacts from other companies’ decisions, transmission topology, environmental regulation,
investment time, and choices of technologies on various investment plans. In all the cases, the supply is
greater than the electricity demand at any hour.
4.3.4 Results
Hourly economic dispatch is run on the test system for 364 days per annum through the whole
planning horizon. Five plans of iGENCO under four epistemic scenarios are extensively evaluated,
assessed and compared via criteria and indicators mentioned in the framework. They provide insights
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of the generation planning in complex power systems under uncertainty.
4.3.4.1 iGENCO Study Profit Performance Statistics
Table 4.3 iGENCO study profit performance statistics (billion $)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0
34.43 0.3893 34.69 0.3903 34.84 0.4000 34.32 0.4058 33.42 0.3889
54.65 22.09 54.96 21.96 55.38 22.43 55.24 21.22 54.14 20.98
Sc
45.88 0.4514 46.80 0.4494 46.00 0.4557 45.18 0.4582 44.62 0.4496
69.31 30.01 70.03 30.55 69.37 30.29 68.57 29.14 68.71 28.56
St
30.44 0.2853 35.39 0.2818 36.06 0.2895 34.20 0.2749 34.19 0.2711
45.47 20.16 49.30 23.97 50.38 24.64 48.18 22.97 48.4 22.90
Sgc
50.11 0.5921 50.53 0.6010 50.31 0.5990 49.62 0.5935 48.81 0.5890
81.03 29.87 81.45 29.77 81.28 30.18 79.95 29.45 79.95 28.28
Every plan has four profit performance statistics under an epistemic scenario, which are shown in
a two-by-two matrix. Expected value is in the upper left corner; standard deviation is in the upper
right corner; the highest present value of profit (billion $) over 20 years is in the lower left corner; the
lowest present value of profit (billion $) over 20 years is in the lower right corner. The following are the
observations found in the table:
• Plan A performs significantly differently from other plans under St . The transmission plan under
St was especially designed for Plan A to increase the system’s efficiency. When the system adds
an appropriate transmission line, cheaper generators, via the new pathway, can supply the sink
buses. In our case study, iGENCO loses a large portion of profits in Plan A, because LMPs
are reduced significantly compared to So due to efficient use of cheap generation. For other
investment plans, the generators are not placed in the proper places with proper capacities with
respect to the new transmission plan, therefore, the new transmission plan is not able to reduce
LMPs significantly. The evidence in the case study supports the saying that the performances of
generation and transmission plans are highly interactional.
• The profits are higher under cases with the carbon tax policy. The carbon tax policy adds ad-
ditional costs in operations of fuel-fired generators. Since the marginal generators are usually
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fuel-fired, local marginal prices increase, correspondingly. The revenues of generators, partially
depending on the differences between LMPs and regular operations costs, increase.
• Variances are the highest under Sgc, the second highest under Sc, the third highest under S0, and
finally the lowest under St . Basically, the variance increases with deepening renewable energy
penetration in the system, due to energy intermittency. It is very interesting to see that St has the
lowest variance. A well-designed transmission network can efficiently transport the renewable
generations with complementary outputs to sink node, and reduce the uncertainty from renewable
energy intermittency, which is the reason of variance reduction in Plan A. Complementary output
means when some renewable generators operate at their low capacity factors, others operate at
their high capacity factors, such as wind and solar generators at nearby locations. However, in
other plans, it is because of the reduced production of renewable energy. Table 4.14 provides
supporting evidence.
• Generally, consistent with intuition, the larger the variance, the larger the difference between the
minimal and maximal profits of plans under an epistemic scenario.
• With regards to the maximal profits, they are much higher under Sgc than Sc, although their min-
ima are subtly different. Because the ordinary market prices follow a hockey stick shape, the
slope of price with respect to demand is sharp after some turning point. If we treat intermittent
renewable generations as negative demand, the net demand is defined as the original real elec-
tricity demand plus the negative demand. The change of the net demand will result in change
of prices, thus profits. If the net demand is greater than the demand at the turning point on the
demand-price curve, slight change of net demand will lead to significant changes of prices and
profits, otherwise subtle changes of profits. The maximal profits happen under aleatoric scenarios
with higher net demand where LMPs climb up owing to lacking of renewable generation sup-
ply. Under maximal profit aleatoric scenarios, the net demand under Sgc is larger than under Sc,
since Sgc has more renewable generation unavailable under those scenarios. As a result, maximal
profits are much higher under Sgc than Sc. Similar analysis is applicable for subtle differences
between minimal profits. In summary, the maximal profits occur when renewable generators are
at low outputs; the minimal profits take place when the renewable generators are at high outputs.
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• Optimal solutions change according to the weighting of epistemic uncertainty and optimization
philosophies. The weights (probabilities) of epistemic scenarios are not statistically definable,
and decision makers assign subjective weights. Optimal plans differ under different weights, for
example, if St weighs one, the optimal plan is Plan C, if Sgc weighs one, the optimal plan is Plan
B. On the other hand, the optimal plan is Plan C if decision maker wants to maximize minimal
profit, while Plan E outperforms other plans if decision maker prefers a small variance plan.
Thus, from the profit performance statistics, there does not exist a dominant optimal plan. Our
framework evaluates all the statistics to help the decision maker compare the investment plans
comprehensively.
• We observe the renewable energy’s two counter effects. One is increasing LMPs due to lacking
intermittent energy supply, and the other is reducing LMPs due to low operating cost.
4.3.4.2 iGENCO Expected Regret and Its Standard Deviation
Table 4.4 iGENCO expected regrets (billion $)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0 0.3949 0.0308 0.00403 0.5128 1.475
Sc 1.0142 0 0.9239 1.8526 2.2519
St 7.5431 0.7883 0 2.4031 1.9149
Sgc 0.5798 0 0.4082 1.2408 1.8382
Table 4.4 shows the expected regrets in all cases. It measures the potential profit loss under uncer-
tainty. A robust plan is not volatile under uncertainty and inclined to have small regrets. We have the
following findings:
• Plan A has the largest expected regret, which accounts for 24.5% of its expected profit under St ,
consistent with its lowest expected profit. The least expected regret of Plan A occurs under So.
The expected regrets in orders, from minimum to maximum are under St , So, Sgc, Sc, consistent
with the orders of the difference between Plan A’s mean profits in the same epistemic scenarios.
Expected regrets are found closely related to the mean values in other plans too. Mean profits are
positively related to the expected regret orders in our case. Usually, the profit with larger mean
profit will have less regret.
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• Plan B has no regrets under Sc and Sgc. It implies that it is better to invest in more renewable
energy under a carbon tax policy. The carbon tax policy is indeed an efficient policy to promote
renewable resources from economic perspective. The expected regrets of Plan B under So and St
are the second smallest compared to other plans, and less than 5% of Plan B’s expected profits.
As a matter of fact, with more than 60% probability, no regret happens under So. Plan B is a
relatively robust plan under considered epistemic scenarios.
• Plan C has no regrets under St . Expected regret under So is the second smallest compared to other
plans. Besides the reason of network topology, regrets of Plan C imply that early investments can
lead to smaller regrets, due to early seizing the market share.
• Plan D has large expected regrets under all the epistemic scenarios, which mean the wind-only
investment is volatile. There is no other technology to compensate the intermittency of wind
outputs, regrets occur when wind generators operate at their low profiles.
• Plan E has large expected regrets under all the epistemic scenarios. The switch of generators to
unprofitable buses reduces the profits (supporting evidence in Table 4.7).
Figure 4.3 regret cumulative density functions under the worst epistemic scenarios
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Figure 4.3 is the regret cumulative density functions when the plans are under their worst epistemic
scenarios. The worst epistemic scenario is defined as the scenario where the least profit occurs. There
are sharp climbs in the regret cumulative density functions, since the coefficients of variation (defined
as standard deviation divided by mean) are small. The regret cumulative density functions of Plan B
and Plan C under So are very closed, but not identical. We also find that the epistemic scenario where
minimal profit happens may not he the one with the highest regret. For example, Plan E has the “worst”
(largest expected) regret curve under Sc, but the minimal profit occurs under So.
Besides the optimization criteria, decision makers also look into the assessment indicators of the
plans for future improvement. Results of six assessment indicators are provided as follows.
4.3.4.3 iGENCO Annual Profit Distribution
Figures 4.4 to 4.8 are vivid visions of iGENCO annual profit performance under both epistemic and
aleatoric uncertainty. The following are some findings and discussions:
• Generally, the probability density functions of annual profits are bell shaped, which is because of
our assumptions of aleatoric uncertainty. The density functions cannot be fit as any well-known
distributions.
• Under Sc or Sgc, the annual variances are larger than under So and St , which are consistent with
the relationships of total profit variances. As the time goes by, there are more and more renewable
generations, and the variances have growing trends.
• The annual profit performances under uncertainty are very helpful information to modify the
candidate plans. For example, the variance increment is an indication of profit vulnerability in
particular years. The reason could be from the system or the plan itself. Modifications would
be made to alleviate the drawbacks. In another instance, the profits increase a lot compared to
the previous year and it is because with a new generator available, decision makers can increase
investments; if it is because there are fewer ongoing investments, decision makers can look ahead
a few more years to see whether the profits have a downward trend, which implies the investments
are still necessary for future profits.
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Figure 4.4 Annual profit distribution of Plan A
Figure 4.5 Annual profit distribution of Plan B
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Figure 4.6 Annual profit distribution of Plan C
Figure 4.7 Annual profit distribution of Plan D
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Figure 4.8 Annual profit distribution of Plan E
4.3.4.4 Profit Capacity Ratio
All the new generators are in the market at some hours, however, not all of them are always prof-
itable. Some generators actually come with negative profits. Although we do not consider generator
retirement in our case study, this indicator is able to give us some clues to retire certain generators and
help decision makers adjust the investments toward a better solution empirically.
Profit capacity ratio is defined as
total revenues of the generator−total operational cost of the generator−total investment cost of the generator· active years20
capacity . The money is
all presented in year 1’s value. Total investment costs include costs occur outside the planning time
frame. Active years are the available years of generator during the planning horizon. For the existing
generators, we assume they are new generators available at year one to obtain their profit capacity ratios.
Tables 4.5 to 4.9 are generator profit capacity ratios of new generators from all plans. Characters B,
E, G, H, N, S, and W before the numbers in the generator names, represent biomass, geothermal, gas-
fired small hydro, nuclear, solar and wind power plants. The number in the generator name represents
the year the generator becomes available. The characters after the number are short names of generator
buses. Usually, they are the first two or three characters of the bus names, with the exception of “SM”
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which means SANMATEO. For example, “B8FU” means biomass generator, built at bus FULTON,
beginning to produce electricity in year 8. The generator names in Plan A are exactly the same in Plan
B, but their capacities are different. The name is not unique in Plan C. The tables supply evidences for
the follow findings and discussions:
Plan A 1. Generator profit capacity ratios are similar under Sgc and Sc, and in most cases, greater
under Sgc than Sc. Ratios are similar under So and St , and in most cases, greater under
So than St . Ratios under Sgc and Sc are greater than under So and St . These findings are
consistent with iGENCO expected total profits. The higher the profit capacity ratio, the
larger the profit.
2. “B2TE” has negative profit in St and So and positive profits in other epistemic scenarios.
Compared to other generators in the same location, it is not cheap, since it is invested early
and depreciated a lot. Moreover, biomass generator has about four times investment cost
than gas-fired generators. However, under Sc and Sgc, the carbon tax policy increases
“B2TE” cost competitiveness by adding extra costs on gas-fired generators and leads to
profitability.
3. “E11TE” has an extremely high ratio under Sgc and Sc. In fact, geothermal generator has a
higher profit capacity ratio than other generators in the same epistemic scenarios. It is due
to geothermal generator’s characteristics of constant supply and zero fuel cost.
4. Ratio of “D7HU” is negative under all the epistemic scenarios. However, “D14HU” is pos-
itive. It means the technology type and location are fine, but the time to install “D7HU”
should be postponed, or the capacity of “D14HU” should be reduced if “D7HU” is prof-
itable before the appearance of “D14HU”. Similar analysis can be done on “S14ME” and
“S3ME”.
5. Ratios of wind generators in TELSA are less than in PITTSBURGH, and these ratios in
PITTSBURGH are less than in MESA CAL (except for “W19ME”). The wind technology
investment in less profitable areas is recommended to move to more profitable areas.
6. The evidence suggests that it is more profitable to have generators available around the mid
period during the planning horizon. For example, “W8PI” and “W10ME” are more prof-
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itable than other wind generators in the same locations. It is because around mid-periods,
the electricity demands increase to require significant investments, and the renewable gen-
erations are not high in the energy market yet. Renewable technology investments with low
operations cost around mid-periods are likely to gain more market share and profits. Wind
technology with relatively low levelized investment cost, zero-fuel cost and extremely low
operating cost, are a competitive choice.
Plan B Plan B has the same generator names, therefore, their technology types, available years, and
locations are the same, but their capacity is not. Plan B has more renewable and less nonrenewable
generations than Plan A.
1. It is very interesting to see that generator profit capacity ratios in Plan B have similar rela-
tionships as observed from one to five in Plan A. For most generators, the values are close
too, with slight reductions in generation with high variability and small increase in gen-
eration with low variability. The generations with high variability lose profit due to low
outputs or inefficient utilization of high outputs at some hours. With investment in storage
technology, the condition can be improved.
2. Generally, generator profit capacity ratios are higher in Plan B than Plan A under St .
3. Besides the negative ratios mentioned in Plan A, “W3TE” also has negative ratio under St .
Actually, generator bus TELSA has lower LMPs in Plan B than Plan A. Thus, “W3TE” has
lower revenues and negative ratios. iGENCO is suggested to reduce investments in TELSA.
Plan C 1. “D6HU” becomes worse than in Plan B, because early investment has higher investment
costs.
2. “B5RO” is a new negative generator under St compared to Plan B, because of low LMPs.
Biomass technology is not easily profitable due to its operations costs and high investment
costs without policy intervention.
Plan D 1. LMPs are reduced by mass of installations of wind generators in TELSA, and lead to
negative ratios of “W2TE” and “W3TE”. There are intense price competitions in TELSA,
since generation companies made numerous investments in this bus. LMPs in this bus are
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low. We will suggest retiring old generators or reducing renewable technology investments
in this bus.
Plan E 1. “D7SM” has negative ratios under all the epistemic scenarios, since it has relatively high
operating cost in generator bus SANMATEO. Decision maker can consider moving this
generator to ROUND MT where gas-fired generator can have positive profits under all the
scenarios.
2. “B2FU”, “W2TE” and “B5TE” also have negative profits under St due to less cost compet-
itiveness.
Table 4.5 New generator profit capacity ratios of Plan A (million $)
Generator S0 Sc St Sgc Generator S0 Sc St Sgc
B8FU 3.27 6.10 2.59 6.42 B5PI 1.81 3.84 1.34 4.13
E5FU 6.47 8.75 5.93 9.00 B19PI 1.18 2.21 1.17 2.22
G17FU 2.52 4.59 2.07 4.58 G12PI 2.71 4.76 2.11 5.18
W3TE 0.23 0.06 0.17 0.55 B5HU 1.25 3.02 0.84 3.42
D19TE 0.89 1.70 0.85 1.85 D7HU –0.29 –0.29 –0.29 –0.28
D8TE 2.77 4.18 2.04 4.91 D14HU 3.30 5.80 2.49 6.29
B2TE –0.06 1.17 –0.37 1.41 B15HU 3.49 6.35 2.89 6.52
E11TE 8.81 12.50 8.29 12.39 B3SM 0.93 2.60 0.50 2.92
G4TE 1.49 2.07 1.03 2.62 B8SM 3.23 6.06 2.60 6.39
D10MC 2.98 4.92 2.18 5.80 B6SM 2.33 4.62 1.80 4.96
G15MC 3.53 6.23 2.63 6.71 D1PO 0.97 1.12 0.72 1.53
B6MC 2.41 4.81 1.88 5.39 D9PO 2.84 4.48 2.09 5.23
D19MC 1.09 2.05 0.84 2.28 G6PO 1.85 2.77 1.37 3.40
G5MID 1.91 2.80 1.49 3.89 G12PO 2.76 4.86 2.02 5.31
D10MID 3.17 5.40 2.22 6.97 D8ME 2.35 3.90 1.72 4.99
G15MID 3.80 6.72 2.33 8.18 S4ME 2.15 3.16 1.91 3.32
B3MID 1.35 3.24 0.89 4.15 S14ME 3.97 5.77 3.30 5.98
B6RO 1.38 3.19 0.70 3.30 W5ME 2.40 3.34 2.11 3.59
G8RO 2.58 4.02 1.59 4.64 W15ME 3.23 4.65 2.49 4.82
E7RO 7.62 10.35 6.52 9.94 W10ME 3.42 4.87 2.91 5.18
B14RO 3.34 6.08 2.39 5.58 W19ME 1.04 1.56 0.74 1.58
H13SU 5.07 7.32 4.39 7.05 G1SM 0.89 1.10 0.60 1.52
H3SU 3.18 4.27 2.83 4.37 G4SM 1.49 2.07 1.06 2.62
W2PI 1.09 1.66 0.97 1.71 G8SM 2.44 3.81 1.81 4.45
W8PI 2.56 3.61 2.35 3.64 G12SM 2.76 4.84 2.06 5.26
W17PI 1.89 2.84 1.83 2.67 B12SM 3.98 7.40 3.32 7.51
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Table 4.6 New generator profit capacity ratios of Plan B (million $)
Generator S0 Sc St Sgc Generator S0 Sc St Sgc
B8FU 3.26 6.07 3.28 6.40 B5PI 1.80 3.81 2.58 4.11
E5FU 6.46 8.72 8.46 8.97 B19PI 1.17 2.18 1.16 2.19
G17FU 2.49 4.54 2.06 4.55 G12PI 2.72 4.74 2.12 5.18
W3TE 0.21 0.57 –0.17 0.53 B5HU 1.26 3.02 2.25 3.43
D19TE 0.88 1.67 0.84 1.82 D7HU –0.29 –0.29 –0.29 –0.27
D8TE 2.76 4.16 1.41 4.88 D14HU 3.31 5.80 2.47 6.32
B2TE –0.06 1.15 –1.07 1.40 B15HU 3.48 6.32 2.85 6.51
E11TE 8.78 12.44 8.17 12.31 B3SM 0.93 2.59 2.30 2.91
G4TE 1.49 2.07 0.06 2.62 B8SM 3.23 6.03 3.10 6.36
D10MC 3.02 4.97 2.03 5.88 B6SM 2.33 4.60 3.35 4.94
G15MC 3.55 6.23 2.58 6.75 D1PO 0.99 1.13 1.68 1.55
B6MC 2.43 4.83 3.83 5.41 D9PO 2.86 4.50 2.18 5.26
D19MC 1.08 2.02 0.85 2.27 G6PO 1.87 2.79 2.35 3.42
G5MID 1.99 2.90 2.85 4.02 G12PO 2.78 4.88 2.02 5.34
D10MID 3.28 5.53 1.86 7.15 D8ME 2.43 3.99 1.29 5.11
G15MID 3.86 6.80 2.31 8.32 S4ME 2.16 3.16 1.65 3.33
B3MID 1.41 3.31 1.77 4.24 S14ME 3.96 5.75 3.10 5.96
B6RO 1.34 3.12 0.21 3.25 W5ME 2.36 3.28 1.93 3.50
G8RO 2.55 3.96 0.91 4.59 W15ME 3.16 4.50 2.20 4.61
E7RO 7.55 10.24 5.73 9.83 W10ME 3.37 4.77 2.54 5.04
B14RO 3.31 6.02 2.29 5.53 W19ME 0.98 1.44 0.66 1.40
H13SU 5.07 7.31 4.36 7.05 G1SM 0.90 1.11 2.10 1.54
H3SU 3.19 4.27 2.95 4.37 G4SM 1.51 2.08 3.02 2.64
W2PI 1.09 1.65 1.39 1.70 G8SM 2.45 3.81 2.32 4.45
W8PI 2.54 3.59 2.42 3.62 G12SM 2.77 4.84 2.08 5.28
W17PI 1.87 2.81 1.81 2.64 B12SM 3.98 7.38 3.33 7.50
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Table 4.7 New generator profit capacity ratios of Plan C (million $)
Generator S0 Sc St Sgc Generator S0 Sc St Sgc
B7FU 2.88 5.45 3.44 5.79 B4PI 1.41 3.24 2.19 3.54
E4FU 5.90 7.97 7.86 8.22 B18PI 2.15 4.01 2.11 3.83
G16FU 3.20 5.65 2.46 5.58 G11PI 2.65 4.57 1.96 5.07
W2TE 0.00 0.33 –0.33 0.30 B4HU 0.87 2.47 1.83 2.86
D18TE 1.63 3.07 1.53 3.13 D6HU –0.33 –0.33 –0.33 –0.32
D7TE 2.57 3.73 1.07 4.47 D13HU 3.29 5.74 2.38 6.34
B1TE –0.51 0.60 –1.38 0.83 B14HU 3.59 6.58 2.93 6.84
E10TE 9.01 12.57 8.13 12.63 B2SM 0.43 1.94 1.58 2.25
G3TE 1.28 1.72 0.12 2.25 B7SM 2.86 5.41 3.18 5.77
D9MC 2.95 4.67 2.48 5.59 B5SM 1.88 3.96 3.16 4.30
G14MC 3.63 6.37 2.65 6.97 D0PO 0.83 0.91 1.40 1.27
B5MC 1.99 4.17 3.69 4.73 D8PO 2.73 4.15 2.25 4.94
D18MC 1.90 3.54 1.51 3.84 G5PO 1.63 2.37 2.25 2.98
G4MID 1.77 2.48 2.33 3.47 G11PO 2.67 4.64 1.88 5.17
D9MID 2.99 4.98 2.09 6.52 D7ME 2.11 3.38 1.24 4.43
G14MID 3.93 6.93 2.37 8.42 S3ME 1.68 2.60 1.28 2.76
B2MID 0.82 2.54 0.99 3.38 S13ME 4.26 6.14 3.34 6.39
B5RO 0.89 2.52 –0.18 2.66 W4ME 2.12 2.98 1.78 3.21
G7RO 2.33 3.52 0.75 4.19 W14ME 3.45 4.95 2.60 5.15
E6RO 6.87 9.34 5.17 8.99 W9ME 3.27 4.65 2.62 4.96
B13RO 3.27 6.02 2.21 5.65 W18ME 1.85 2.73 1.34 2.82
H12SU 5.16 7.39 4.42 7.24 G0SM 0.69 0.82 1.68 1.19
H2SU 2.79 3.78 2.55 3.88 G3SM 1.28 1.72 2.59 2.25
W1PI 0.81 1.32 1.05 1.37 G7SM 2.24 3.37 2.57 4.02
W7PI 2.38 3.33 2.36 3.38 G11SM 2.68 4.63 1.94 5.12
W16PI 2.37 3.51 2.20 3.28 B11SM 3.84 7.19 3.13 7.38
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Table 4.8 New generator profit capacity ratios of Plan D (million $)
Generator S0 Sc St Sgc Generator S0 Sc St Sgc
W8TE 1.17 1.78 0.91 1.70 W5ME 2.28 3.16 1.90 3.36
W5TE 0.64 1.08 0.18 1.03 W19ME 0.97 1.42 0.67 1.38
G17FU 2.65 4.77 2.13 4.82 G12PI 3.01 5.15 2.21 5.65
W3TE 0.23 0.59 –0.20 0.56 W5ME 2.28 3.16 1.90 3.36
D19TE 0.95 1.78 0.88 1.96 D7HU –0.29 –0.29 –0.29 –0.26
D8TE 3.25 4.75 1.48 5.60 D14HU 3.49 6.03 2.57 6.59
W2TE 0.01 0.34 –0.37 0.31 W15ME 3.09 4.38 2.20 4.46
W11TE 1.41 2.11 1.33 1.98 W3ME 1.73 2.44 1.42 2.61
G4TE 1.81 2.44 0.10 3.06 W8ME 2.94 4.12 2.39 4.37
D10MC 3.23 5.20 2.11 6.17 W6ME 2.53 3.50 2.11 3.73
G15MC 3.68 6.39 2.67 6.92 D1PO 1.15 1.31 1.79 1.77
W6TE 0.83 1.32 0.44 1.27 D9PO 3.21 4.91 2.29 5.76
D19MC 1.10 2.05 0.88 2.30 G6PO 2.16 3.11 2.52 3.82
G5MID 1.89 2.73 3.03 3.82 G12PO 2.99 5.15 2.10 5.66
D10MID 3.13 5.26 1.87 6.83 D8ME 2.29 3.77 1.32 4.86
G15MID 3.71 6.54 2.34 7.98 W4ME 2.02 2.81 1.68 3.00
W3TE 0.23 0.59 –0.20 0.56 W14ME 3.30 4.67 2.39 4.76
W6TE 0.83 1.32 0.44 1.27 W5ME 2.28 3.16 1.90 3.36
G8RO 3.04 4.57 1.05 5.30 W15ME 3.09 4.38 2.20 4.46
W7TE 1.02 1.56 0.69 1.50 W10ME 3.30 4.64 2.53 4.88
W14PI 2.87 4.19 2.64 4.08 W19ME 0.97 1.42 0.67 1.38
W13PI 2.90 4.23 2.68 4.16 G1SM 1.09 1.32 2.22 1.80
W3TE 0.23 0.59 –0.20 0.56 G4SM 1.79 2.40 3.20 3.03
W2PI 1.20 1.78 1.44 1.85 G8SM 2.83 4.26 2.46 5.00
W8PI 2.72 3.80 2.47 3.88 G12SM 3.02 5.17 2.16 5.67
W17PI 1.95 2.92 1.84 2.76 W12PI 2.91 4.21 2.65 4.18
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Table 4.9 New generator profit capacity ratios of Plan E (million $)
Generator S0 Sc St Sgc Generator S0 Sc St Sgc
B8TE 2.59 4.91 1.46 5.15 B5TE 1.30 3.00 –0.14 3.25
E5TE 6.79 9.11 4.28 9.24 B19TE 0.95 1.80 0.95 1.80
G17TE 2.38 4.36 2.08 4.26 G12TE 2.76 4.81 2.13 5.25
W3TE 0.22 0.58 –0.17 0.54 B5SM 1.93 4.01 3.31 4.33
D19FU 0.96 1.83 0.83 1.97 D7SM –0.29 –0.29 –0.29 –0.26
D8FU 2.91 4.34 2.77 5.08 D14SM 3.32 5.80 2.54 6.06
B2FU 0.48 1.99 2.03 2.28 B15SM 4.20 7.57 3.51 7.37
E11FU 8.66 12.00 7.88 12.43 B3SM 1.02 2.70 2.36 3.02
G4FU 1.57 2.17 3.51 2.71 B8SM 3.34 6.19 3.08 6.50
D10HU 2.90 4.80 1.88 5.59 B6SM 2.42 4.73 3.38 5.05
G15HU 3.43 6.06 2.52 6.39 D1PO 1.02 1.18 1.67 1.59
B6HU 1.71 3.69 2.37 4.10 D9PO 2.92 4.58 2.12 5.32
D19HU 1.03 1.95 0.83 2.15 G6PO 1.93 2.86 2.33 3.49
G5MID 1.88 2.76 2.69 3.85 G12PO 2.79 4.90 1.99 5.34
D10MID 3.18 5.44 1.73 7.01 D8ME 2.34 3.90 1.35 5.02
G15MID 3.88 6.90 2.26 8.38 S4ME 2.14 3.16 1.74 3.33
B3MID 1.33 3.23 1.65 4.14 S14ME 3.99 5.81 3.26 6.05
B6RO 1.45 3.26 0.21 3.39 W5PI 1.91 2.69 2.22 2.73
G8RO 2.69 4.15 0.89 4.79 W15PI 2.63 3.87 2.44 3.69
E7RO 7.71 10.00 5.75 10.04 W10PI 2.79 3.98 2.50 3.99
B14RO 3.33 6.05 2.28 5.57 W19PI 0.73 1.12 0.74 1.11
H13SU 5.08 7.34 4.37 7.11 G1MC 0.78 0.98 2.43 1.45
H3SU 3.21 4.30 2.95 4.42 G4MC 1.46 2.04 3.48 2.69
W2TE 0.00 0.32 –0.34 0.29 G8MC 2.39 3.81 2.48 4.60
W8TE 1.15 1.75 0.94 1.67 G12MC 2.87 5.05 2.01 5.70
W17TE 1.02 1.52 1.03 1.35 B12MC 4.16 7.75 3.26 8.27
4.3.4.5 iGENCO Emissions
Table 4.10 shows expected iGENCO’s total emissions in all cases. “Expected” is with respect to the
aleatoric uncertainty. The following are the observations from the table:
• Counter-intuitively, emissions are larger under Sc than in So and further increased under Sgc.
Actually, the system’s total CO2 emissions under Sc are less than under So. iGENCO produces
more emissions by generating nonrenewable energy to compensate for the intermittent supply of
renewable generators of other generation companies. It also means the system’s results are not
positively related to individual generation company’s results.
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Table 4.10 Expected iGENCO’s total emissions (million ton)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0 193.45 149.58 201.84 195.69 197.81
Sc 195.29 150.34 203.60 197.65 199.37
St 178.71 140.47 187.69 182.11 181.32
Sgc 198.74 155.11 207.91 200.94 205.16
• Compared to other epistemic scenarios, emission reductions under St are significant due to in-
creasing efficiency of renewable energy deliverability in Plan A, and due to generation reductions
in other plans.
4.3.4.6 iGENCO Renewable Generation Portfolio
Table 4.11 iGENCO renewable generation portfolios (%)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0 30.82 40.97 31.09 29.28 29.45
Sc 31.15 41.23 31.43 29.56 29.79
St 31.34 41.13 31.24 29.20 29.43
Sgc 30.94 40.95 31.18 29.58 29.42
Table 4.11 shows iGENCO renewable generation portfolios under twenty cases, which are average
renewable generations divided by average total generations through the whole planning horizon. Emis-
sions and renewable generation portfolio are two distinct assessment indicators for decision makers.
Emissions tell how much the polluting resources are, and renewable generation portfolio tells us how
percentage of eligible renewable energy. The findings are summarized in the following:
• Generally, renewable generation portfolios are higher under Sc than Sgc and So. The carbon
tax policy increases the usages of renewable generators with not-low operations cost, such as
biomass. At the same time, under Sgc, iGENCO produces more nonrenewable generation to com-
pensate for renewable intermittent outputs from other generation companies, and hence reduces
its own renewable generation portfolios.
• Renewable generation portfolios are significantly smaller in Plan D and Plan E than other plans.
Plan D has wind technology as single renewable resource. Surplus wind energy is not injected
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into grid. Plan E moves renewable generators from efficient areas to less efficient areas, such as
“W10ME” to “W10PI”, and reduces renewable energy production.
• Plan B has higher renewable portfolios compared to other plans under the same epistemic sce-
narios, it is because Plan B has more renewable capacities essentially. The highest renewable
generation portfolio appears in Plan B under Sc.
• The reason why Plan A under St has higher renewable portfolio than under So is because the new
transmission plan reduces congestions and delivers more clean energy. For other plans, renewable
generation portfolios under St might be higher or lower than under So, depending strongly on the
efficiency of energy delivery. It may fail to transmit the renewable energy at their peak outputs,
or fail to deliver the nonrenewable energy when loads are at peaks.
• There are no distinct correlations between emissions and a renewable energy portfolio. The clean
energy might not be defined as renewable energy, such as large hydro. For this reason emissions
might be a better index to describe cleanness of the systems.
4.3.4.7 Expected System’s Total Profit and Profit Difference
Table 4.12 Expected system’s total profit (billion $)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0 350.54 351.43 351.95 363.77 352.38
Sc 491.50 492.74 493.21 505.13 493.56
St 334.96 341.58 340.63 345.44 340.37
Sgc 547.57 548.54 550.46 565.54 550.20
Table 4.12 shows expected system’s total profits in all the cases. Table 4.13 shows the revenue
differences with respect to Plan A under all the epistemic scenarios from iGENCO and non-iGENCO
entities. The last row is the investment cost difference of all plans with respect to Plan A. The values
in the brackets are the profit differences of iGENCO between other plans and Plan A. The findings and
discussion are presented as follows:
• Plan D has the highest system’s total profits under all the epistemic scenarios, but Plan D is not
thought highly of from iGENCO’s point of view, based on previous optimization criteria and
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Table 4.13 Expected system’s total profit difference (billion $)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0 iGENCO 0 4.0169 (0.26) 0.2119 (0.41) 0.8565 (-0.09) -1.01 (-1.01)
S0 non iGENCO 0 0.63 1.00 12.373 2.85
Sc iGENCO 0 4.6769 (0.92) -0.0781 (0.12) 0.2465 (-0.7) -1.26 (-1.26)
Sc non iGENCO 0 0.32 1.59 14.33 3.32
St iGENCO 0 8.7069 (4.95) 5.4219 (5.62) 4.7065 (3.76) 3.75 (3.75)
St non iGENCO 0 1.67 0.05 6.72 1.66
Sgc iGENCO 0 4.1769 (0.42) 0.0019 (0.2) 0.4565 (-0.49) -1.3 (-1.3)
Sgc non iGENCO 0 0.55 2.69 18.4 3.93
Investment Cost 0 3.97569 -0.1981 0.9465 0
assessment indicators.
• Positive revenue difference with negative or less profit difference means that the generators are
in need but the investment costs are high. We may suggest iGENCO keeping investing in the
same capacities in the same locations but change to technologies with less investment costs (The
operating cost should still be lower than marginal cost at the generator buses.) For example, by
looking at Plan B, we could consider replace small hydro power plants with geothermal plants.
• If the revenue difference of iGENCO is significantly less than revenue difference of non-iGENCO,
it might be because of the lack of renewable generation in some hours, specifically Plan D in our
case study. Since the revenue is determined by multiplication of LMP and generation, the effec-
tive wind generation is really low in iGENCO and loses profit opportunities. One way to modify
Plan D is trying to increase generation. We may suggest replacing the wind technology with other
technologies that can have significant outputs at hours when wind cannot.
4.3.4.8 Curtailment
Table 4.14 Expected system’s total curtailment (million MWh)
Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D Plan E
S0 8.7437 8.8711 8.5069 9.6178 8.8281
Sc 8.8054 8.9338 8.5774 9.6943 9.2048
St 7.7196 22.306 20.595 23.888 22.014
Sgc 11.579 11.779 11.397 13.094 11.742
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Table 4.14 shows expected system’s total curtailment in all the cases. The curtailment is less than
5% at any hour during the whole planning horizon. Other findings are listed as follows:
• Plan B has larger curtailments than other plans, and curtailments are all the largest under Sg\.
These results imply that the intermittency of renewable generation causes curtailment increments
in our case study. The results can be improved if the renewable generators are connected to
storages.
• Plan A has the smallest curtailment under St . The new transmission plan is specifically designed
for Plan A, and does not perform well under other plans with regard to curtailment.
4.3.4.9 Result Summary
The plans are elaborately designed to answer key questions raised in generation expansion plan-
ning, which are the investment time, location, technology and capacity of generator. Plan A is a mod-
erate baseline plan. Base on Plan A, we observe the evidence that performances of transmission and
generation planning are highly interactional. Plan B increases investments in renewable generation,
significantly reduces the emissions and increases the renewable energy portfolios. Luckily, the profit
variances do not significantly increase in Plan B. It is because the resource mix of renewable gener-
ators. A lot of generators with stable outputs, such geothermal, small hydro and biomass generators
are considered. Plan C invests in all the generators one year earlier. It increases CO2 emissions due
to early depreciations of generators. It also increases the renewable generation portfolio, since there is
less competition in renewable energy if the renewable generators are invested in earlier. Plan D studies
impacts of the technology of generators. Compared to Plan A, wind energy is not fully delivered to the
grid and results in less renewable energy portfolio and more emissions. Plan E switches the generators
to unprofitable locations and reduces the profits. Generally speaking, performances of all the plans
are similar in epistemic scenarios, and there is no absolute winner considering multiple optimization
criteria.
The most direct effect of the carbon tax policy on current power systems is to increase the operations
cost of generations. Consequentially, it increases the system’s LMPs. Generation companies must
increase the market shares of low-operations-cost generations to gain more benefit from higher LMPs.
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Finally, the carbon tax policy plays a role as indirect incentives in renewable technology investment.
With the most renewable generator investments, Plans B has the highest profits among all the plans
when the systems are imposed on the carbon tax policy.
Two counter effects of renewable generation are observed. One is to lower LMPs due to low op-
erations cost of renewable generation. The other is to increase LMPs during the hours that renewable
generations are at their low outputs.
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion
4.4.1 Conclusion
Structured investment planning model using the three-layer framework with explicit quantification
of uncertainty and representation of environmental regulations is tested via a practical case study. The
case study analysis answers a wide range of questions related to the impacts of the penetration of
renewable energy, implementation of environmental policies, and the expansion/improvement of the
transmission grid. Specifically, in the case study, we use a 240-bus WECC network to test our frame-
work of generation expansion under both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. The framework is able to
produce a set of practically oriented results of direct benefit to decision makers, by providing insightful
guidance for decision robustness and improvement. The carbon tax policy is found able to lead to higher
profits. The potential improvements of existing plans are discussed based on the assessment indicators.
The counter effects of renewable generation make the results more complicated, in which case it is hard
to find a absolute winner under multiple optimization criteria.
4.4.2 Discussion
The novel framework can benefit many agencies. Related agencies could gain the insights into the
planning strategies/investment decisions from the framework that involves multiple market players and
entities. This research will bring about major benefits to generation/transmission companies, investors,
ISOs/RTOs or regulatory agencies, equipment vendors, as well as power consumers in the following
ways:
• The framework develops practical approaches to the determination and modification of invest-
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ment strategies that comply with environmental policy requirements and considers explicitly their
associated sources of uncertainty. Such approaches will be of valuable benefit to investors and
generation/ transmission companies that undertake such decisions. For example, the decision
problem formulation will be able to quantify the appropriate timing and impacts of generator re-
tirements. Moreover, the approach will also be able to determine the most appropriate generation
technologies for the replacement of the units that are retired.
• ISOs/RTOs will be able to use the methodology to gain new insights into decision process for in-
vestment in new technologies, the investment vs. retirement evaluation when a retrofit is required
for an existing resources to remain compliant with environmental regulations, and the impacts
of various components of the investment decision process on the system’s reliability and market
performance. ISOs/RTOs or regulatory agencies will be provided with an approach capable of
providing a quantitative evaluation of the environmental policies.
• Vendors will find the analytic framework proposed useful to estimate the market growth in future
years and to align their offerings in line with the investment preferences of the decision makers.
• Electricity consumers will benefit directly by the case study results and findings of the market
outcomes for future participation in demand-side management programs.
In the framework, there exist two major limitations. On one hand, the computational time is the most
difficult obstacle. In our case study, in order to keep the resolution, we run the OPF for every single hour
through twenty years. It requires too much time to search through a continuous domain of generation
investment decisions and epistemic uncertainty. We only select a few representative candidate plans
to conduct sensitivity analysis in selective epistemic scenarios. On the other hand, in order to study
the impacts of intermittency of renewable generation and load uncertainty, numerous scenarios under
aleatoric uncertainty should be generated from appropriate fitted distributions. However, since only
8760-hour data is available, it is impossible to fit the spatial and time correlation or distribution of
wind generation and/or other renewable generation, and load. Therefore, we have to make some harsh
assumptions on the approach of scenario generations.
In the future, resolution of the case study will be sacrificed for increment of investment action
domain. The action domain would be continuous. The operational layer would run the OPF through
95
representative hours only. The optimization layer would intelligently modify their investment decisions
dynamically referring to the assessment results. The decision makers could reassess the existing plan
by referring to realized events.
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Assumptions and Formulation in the Operations Layer
Nomenclature
Sets:
I set of nodes (buses), i, j ∈I
M set of generation companies, m ∈M
G set of types of generation technologies, g ∈ G
G s set of types of storage technologies, gs ∈ G s
L set of transmission lines, l ∈ L . l(o, i, j) contains line’s “from” node i,“to”
node j information and identification number o for overlapped lines.
L 1 set of transmission lines to be constructed, l1 ∈L 1
H set of hours, h ∈H
Y set of years, y ∈ Y
Parameters:
γl susceptance of line l. (S)
Fl transmission capacity of line l. (MW)
nGmigy generation expansion decision binary variable, if n
G
migy =1, generator of tech-
nology g located at node i would be expanded by generation company m and
in service in year y. We assume nGmigy =1 for existing generators, and n
G
migy =0
for retired generators. (NA)
Ω payment for not-served energy. ($/MWh)
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∆h minimal time interval, ∆h = 1 hour. (hour)
Csmigsy storage operating cost of technology g
s owned by generation company m at
node i in period y. ($/MWh)
ηmighy capacity factor of technology g owned by generation company m at node i at
hour h in period y. (NA)
ςmigsy charging/discharging efficiency of technology gs owned by generation com-
pany m at node i in period y. (NA)
Gmigy capacity of technology g owned by generation company m at node i in period
y. (MW)
Emigy emission rate of technology g owned by generation company m at node i in
period y. (ton/MWh)
Ay emissions cap under the cap-and-trade policy in period y. (ton)
Cmigy operations cost of technology g owned by generation company m at node i in
period y. ($/MWh)
Vihy electric vehicle load before demand-side management at node i at hour h in
period y. (MW)
Ctigy tax (carbon price)(positive) or subsidy (negative) of technology g at node i in
period y. ($/ton)
Sminmigsy minimal state of technology g
s owned by generation company m at node i in
period y. (MWh)
Smaxmigsy maximal state of technology g
s owned by generation company m at node i in
period y. (MWh)
DSMi,y load ratio that is subject to demand-side management at node i in period y.
(NA)
aGmigy service status of generator g owned by generation company m at node i in
period y. If aGmigy =1 (0), the generator is in (out of) service. (NA)
aLly service status of transmission line l in period y. If a
L
ly =1 (0), the transmission
line is in (out of) service. (NA)
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nLly transmission expansion decision binary variable, if n
L
ly =1 , line l would be
available in year y. We assume nLly =1 for existing transmission lines, and n
L
ly
=0 for retired transmission lines. (NA)
Sliy node-arc incident element of line l starting from node i in period y. (NA)
Qihy electricity load before demand-side management at node i at hour h in period
y. (MW)
Decision variables:
qsmighy electricity supply by technology g owned by generation company m at node i
at hour h in period y . (MW)
qdihy real electricity demand at node i of technology g at hour h in period y. (MW)
flhy power flow in line l at hour h in year y. (MW)
θihy voltage angle of node i at hour h in period y. (radius)
scmigshy storage charging quantity of technology g
s owned by generation company m
at node i at hour h in period y. (MWh)
sdmigshy storage discharging quantity of technology g
s owned by generation company
m at node i at hour h in period y. (MWh)
smigshy storage state of technology gs owned by generation company m at node i at
hour h in period y. (MWh)
qfixihy fixed demand at node i at hour h in year y. (MW)
qflxihy flexible demand after demand-side management at node i at hour h in year y.
(MW)
rihy not-served load at node i at hour h in year y. (MW)
This section delineates the fundamental assumptions and generalized formulations in the operations
layer.
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4.5.1.1 Assumptions in the Operations Layer
The main function of the operations layer is to execute market clearing and return comprehensive
market outcomes under all the scenarios generated in the assessment layer. We do not explicitly model
unit commitment of generators, but use lossless DC power flows to obtain market outcomes. The sys-
tem operator is fabricated to regulate the whole WECC system, including the market and transmission
network. In the operations layer, we assume all the information in the market is complete and known by
the system operator. There is no entry or exit of new or existing market players. Generation companies
are not charged for penalty payments of energy-not-served. All the generation companies submit their
true supply pairs (price, capacity) to the system operator, where the price is operations cost (including
fuel cost) and the capacity is the maximal capacity times the capacity factor. Each generator can only
submit one pair of bid in an hour. If generation companies have candidate expansion plans, they would
be reflected in the form of new supply pair. The transmission network, electricity demand, carbon tax,
fuel prices etc. are known parameters, but subject to scenarios in the operations layer.
4.5.1.2 Formulation in the Operations Layer
In this section, economic dispatch problem is formulated using DC power flows. For notation
simplicity, we define a power flow incident matrix Sliy. For transmission line l = l(o, i, j), Sliy =-
Sl jy=aLlyn
L
ly. In this way, the element values of the incident matrix would be updated subject to scenario,
but the dimensions are predefined and will not change. The number of rows is equal to the total number
of existing and candidate transmission lines. The number of columns is the number of buses.
The detailed economic dispatch problem is formulated in Equations (4.1) to (4.14). The system
operator collects the supply and demand bids from generation companies and load serving entity (LSE),
and executes the economic dispatch. We use linearly approximated power flows, and the problem is
linear when the investment plans and scenarios are known. We assume that the economic dispatch is
done hourly.
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The formulation of hourly economic dispatch in period y is written as:
min (∑migh(Cmigy+Ctigy)qsmihy+∑migshC
s
migsy(s
c
mihgsy+ s
d
mihgsy)+Ω∑ih rihy) ·∆h (4.1)
s.t. ∑mg qsmighy+ rihy−qdihy−∑mgs(sc− sd) = ∑l Sliy · flhy,∀i,h (4.2)
flhy = γl(∑i Sliyθihy),∀l,h ∈L , (4.3)
−pi ≤ θihy ≤ pi,∀i,h (4.4)
−Fl ≤ flhy ≤ F,∀l,h ∈L , (4.5)
qSmighy ≤ aGmigynGmigηmighyGmigy,∀m, i,g,h (4.6)
smigs(h+1)y ≤ smigshy+(ςmgsiscmigshy− (ςmgsi)−1sdmigshy) ·∆h,∀m, i,h,gs (4.7)
Sminmigs ≤ smigshy ≤ Smaxmigs ,∀m, i,h,gs (4.8)
qdihy = q
fix
ihy+q
flx
ihy,∀i,h (4.9)
qfixihy = (1−DSMih)(Qihy+Vihy),∀i,h (4.10)
∑h qflxihy = DSMiy∑h(Qihy+Vihy),∀i (4.11)
∑migh Emigyqsmighy∆h≤ Ay (4.12)
qdihy,q
s
mighy,s
c
migshy,s
d
migshy ≥ 0,∀i,g,h (4.13)
θihy, flhy free,∀l, i,h (4.14)
• The terms in the objective function are, respectively, operations cost and carbon tax or subsidy,
storage operations cost, and load curtailment payment. The energy-not-served is subject to a
penalty payment. In order to be compatible with fuel price growth, the penalty cost is set to be as
the 1.5 times the highest operations cost (including the carbon price if there is any).
• Equation (4.2): power balance between supply and demand at node i at hour h in period y. Left
hand side is the net power injection at node i expressed in terms of power supply and demand at
node i, and the right hand side is the net injection expressed in terms of power flows, which is
Kirchhoff’s Current Law. The hourly time-varying electricity demand is inelastic to the electricity
price without demand-side management.
• Equation (4.3): power flow through line l = (o, i, j), which is Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law.
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• Equation (4.4): voltage angle constraint at node i. The voltage angle cannot exceed [−pi,pi].
• Equation (4.5): transmission capacity constraint, which is given and would be fixed through the
planning horizon. We do not consider the depreciation of the line capacity. Incident matrix S and
Equation (4.3) would ensure the flow in outage or non-existing line l is zero.
• Equation (4.6): maximal power generation from generator (m, i,g). Both aGmigy and nGmigy has to
be 1 in order to supply power, either aGmigy = 0 or n
G
migy = 0, the generator does not supply any
power.
• Equation (4.7): storage state at hour h, it is determined by the previous hour state and charging
and discharging quantities at hour h.
• Equation (4.8): maximal and minimal storage state at hour h.
• Equations (4.9)-(4.11)formulate the demand-side management. The load is decomposed into
flexible load qflx and fixed load qfix in Equation 4.9. The flexible load qflx is subject to demand-
side management in Equation 4.11. Equation 4.10 is the amount of hourly fixed load.
• Equation (4.12): total CO2 emissions from the generators are subject to the cap-and-trade policy.
Since the trading profit or cost of CO2 emission allowances is internal from the system operator’s
point of view, we do not consider the trading profit or cost in the objective function.
• Equations (4.13) and (4.14) define the decision variable domains.
Equations (4.1) to (4.14) are generalized to accommodate many possible modifications, such as
maintenance scheduling, N-1 contingency analysis, cap-and-trade policy and so on.
We do not model fuel transportation, and the fuel resources are assumed to be infinite. In our case
study, we focus on the generator technology, and do not consider the maintenance, element outages,
demand-side management and storages. DSMiy and storage capacities are all set to be zero. The emis-
sion cap is infinity. The service status and outage status parameters are all equal to one.
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4.5.2 Data in the Case Study
This section introduces the resource characteristics inherited from [68] and parameters used in the
case study.
4.5.2.1 Resource Characteristics
Existing system conditions are represented as in year 2004, and future conditions as in year 2015.
The resource characteristics, to be continuously used in our case study, are as follows:
• Hourly time-varying load profiles for 21 areas in the whole system are provided in 2004, as
well as load of California Department of Water of Resources (CDWR). It also includes the load
participation factor of all the buses. All the areas have exclusive buses.
• Hourly time-varying profiles for wind and solar resources are aggregated to the buses in the
network for both current and future time frames. There are three aggregated wind areas and one
solar area within CAISO. Meanwhile, there are thirteen aggregated wind areas and four solar
areas (one in the future time frame) outside CAISO.
• Hourly time-varying profiles for geothermal and biomass resources are aggregated within CAISO.
Biomass outside CAISO is aggregated into generic renewable resources. The geothermal output
is assumed to be 80% of maximal capacities.
• If there is no dominant renewable resources and total capacity is limited, the renewable resources
are modeled as generic renewable energy with 70% capacity factor.
• Gas-fired generator is modeled as a dispatchable by using heat rate.
• Coal gasification-fired generator is modeled as gas-fired generation. There is no coal generator
within CAISO, although CAISO might have ownership of coal-fired generators located outside
CAISO.
• There are two nuclear sites within CAISO and two outside CAISO, modeled as 85% to 100% of
capacity.
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• Optimal scheduling or dispatch of hydroelectric generation is complex due to various water flows.
The hourly time-varying profile was obtained from PLEXOS simulation. We continue to use the
PLEXOS results of hydroelectric generation in our case study. In other words, we do not look
into optimal scheduling of the large hydro power plants in our case study.
Besides the resource characteristics listed above, the data file also includes ownership of generators
within CAISO. Generators outside CAISO are aggregated to buses in both current and future time
frames. The generators specifications contain ownership, capacity, heat rate, resource type, capacity
factor, and location. Transmission line specifications include from-bus, to-bus, capacity and impedance
(The transformer is modeled as transmission line). Generally, the transmission lines from 20kV to
higher voltages are with infinite capacities; lines between higher voltages have larger capacities than
lines between lower voltages. It could be multiple overlapping transmission lines connecting two buses.
Generator ownership outside CAISO is modeled as “WECC”. Generator ownerships within CAISO are
PG&E, WESC, CDWR, NCPA, SCEC, SDG&E, PASA, MISC, SMUD, WAPA, SCEM, ECI, RESI,
CPCO, TEK, CCSF, DETM, MDSC, NCVU, and SCVU.
4.5.2.2 Parameters
In order to accommodate the environmental study, emission rate is added to generator specifications.
The emission rate from the same type of generators is not differentiated. Renewable resources are all
carbon clean. Emissions from biomass technologies are not considered as environmental polluted emis-
sions. Similar to emission rate, fuel prices are not differentiated among the same type of technologies.
Parts of heat rates are given in the data file, and the other missing heat rates are assigned as Table 4.15
shows. The assigned heat rates only depend on the types of technology. Table 4.15 lists the emission
rates, fuel prices and investment costs of new generators derived from [14, 75].
In addition to the above, we have the following assumptions on the parameters:
• Since most new generators’ life-times are longer than twenty years, the retirement of generator
is not considered. Lacking of remaining life times of existing generators, we assume existing
generators are new at the beginning of the planning. Generators do not retire, but their capacities
are depreciated.
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Table 4.15 Emission rates, heat rates, fuel prices and investment costs of technologies
Generator Emission rate (kg/MWh) Heat rate (MMBTU/MWh)
Geothermal 0 34.69
Dual-fuel 440 6.7
Small hydro 0 0
Gas 400 7.2
Wind 0 0
Biomass 0 9.646
Nuclear 0 10.5
Dist. oil 758 16.03
Coal 1020 9.79
Solar 0 0
Generic renewable 0 0
Generator Fuel price ($/MMBTU) Invest. cost (million $/MW)
Geothermal 0 3.24
Dual-fuel 4.5 0.55
Small hydro 0 2.00
Gas 4.0 0.78
Wind 0 1.51
Biomass 1.6 2.50
Nuclear 0.75 2.82
Dist. oil 13.23 1.45
Coal 1.5 1.54
Solar 0 3.00
Generic renewable 0 2.00
• Transmission line capacity is constant through the planning horizon.
• Generation capacity is geometrically depreciated 5% annually.
• Generator’s emission rate is geometrically depreciated 5% annually.
• Electricity demand increases linearly 1% annually.
• All the fuel prices increase geometrically 5% annually, but coals are 10%.
• Variable O&M cost geometrically increases by 5% annually.
• Heat rate linearly increases by 5% annually.
• Capacity factor of the same type of generator is identical at the same bus and the same time.
The first year’s capacity factors are derived from the given data. The hourly capacity factors of
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biomass, geothermal, generic renewable, hydro, wind and solar are equal to the generation outputs
divided by 125%, 115%, 135%, 120%, 100% and 110% of the maximal outputs, respectively.
• The discount rate is 5%.
• We assume the planning horizon started in 2004 and will end in 2023.
4.5.3 Scenario Generation
This section introduces the rules, processes and assumptions when we generate scenarios in the case
study.
4.5.3.1 Expansion Rules
Candidate transmission line investment can be invested on the existing routes or new routes satisfy-
ing the following rules:
• New transmission lines rarely cross long physical horizon, unless there are existing routes. Most
candidate line investments are within areas, a few of them are inter-area.
• New lines can be built between the same voltages or 230kV to 115kV, 345kV and 500kV, and
345kV to 500kV.
• The technology parameters such as impedance and capacity use the existing technology data. For
example, the system operator plans to build a new line between Bus A and Bus B. They are both
230kV. Then the operator should look for all the existing lines with both ends at 230kV, and use
one of the technologies as new line technology.
Generation expansion rules are:
• New generators can only be installed in existing generator buses (buses with existing generators).
Buses with WECC generators in the future could also be viewed as generator buses.
• Candidate generators could be small hydro (≤ 30MW), nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, dual-
fuel, gas, biomass, distilled oil and generic renewable. Renewable generators are small hydro (≤
30MW), biomass, geothermal, wind, solar, and generic renewable generators.
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• The investments of the same technology of small generator in the same year are aggregated into
one big generator of the same technology in the same year.
• The generator investment cost is equally distributed through the construction time. The invest-
ment decisions include generator types, capacities, locations and starting times. Other content
like emission rate, construction lead time, variable O&M cost and capacity factor are determined
by the generator technology and location.
• The final generation growth rates of every generation company consist with the total load growth
rate. For example, if the load grows by 20% in year 20, the total generation expansion is also
about 20%.
4.5.3.2 Makeup Process of Aleatoric Scenarios
Figure 4.9 Aleatoric scenario makeup process 1
Figure 4.10 Aleatoric scenario makeup process 2
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We assume the electricity loads or renewable generations among seasons are independent. A week
is the minimal unit for temporal correlations of loads and renewable intermittency. A season is decom-
posed into thirteen non-overlapping weeks. We also assume electricity loads or renewable generations
among the non-overlapping weeks are independent and follow the same distributions if there exists any.
Finally, we make up scenarios under aleatoric uncertainty in the following way:
1. Firstly, as Figure 4.9 shows, we decompose a year into four seasons, and each season includes
13 weeks. We pick one week at a time from the 13 weeks, and repeat 13 times to make one
sub-scenario. If 13 weeks are numbered from one to thirteen, by using polynomial theorem,
distinguished sub-scenario probability follows equation (∑i ni)!∏i(ni)! . ni is the number of week i being
selected. The sum of ni in our case is thirteen. The number of distinguished sub-scenarios follows
equation (n+m−1)!n!(m−1)! . n is the number of selections, and m is the number of options in each selection.
Both of them are thirteen. There are 5200300 sub-scenarios in a season.
2. Secondly, as Figure 4.10 shows, each red dot represents an independent sub-scenario in the cor-
responding season. Then we choose one sub-scenario from each season sequentially to compose
a scenario to represent a whole year in the operations layer. In total, it is 52003004 scenarios in a
year. Those scenarios are viewed as realizations of statistical uncertainty with equal probabilities.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the liberalized energy market, independent generation companies compete to maximize their
own profits from proper operations and expansion decisions. The optimal decisions are subject to
uncertainty from the rapidly changing power system infrastructures and lack of perfect information
from other market entities’ decision-making. The three topics in the dissertation are presented to shed
light on the generation expansion decision-making under the impacts of environmental regulations and
various resources of uncertainty. To elaborate these three topics, the dissertation first compares the
existing environmental regulation with the unimplemented ones to gain economic insights of regulation
implementations and generation company’s strategic behaviors. It then continues by proposing a new
framework and conducting a realistic case study to assess the investment candidates under uncertainty.
In the first publication, presented in Chapter 2, unimplemented carbon tax (subsidy) policies are
used to compare with the cap-and-trade policy implemented in the U.S. with respect to their effec-
tiveness and efficiency. Seven types of tax variations are considered in the content. The oligopoly
generation company’s competitions are modeled by using Nash game theory. A bilevel formulation is
proposed, in which the upper level is formulated to find the most efficient policy to be compared with,
and the lower level models the investment and operation strategies of generation companies under the
policies. The problem is reformulated into a single level problem with complementarity constraints.
The framework is tested on a five bus network to demonstrate comparisons against criteria. It shows
that the most efficient carbon price is the cost difference between renewable and nonrenewable gener-
ators. The cost is the sum of the levelized investment cost and operations cost. The subsidy value is
higher than the tax price due to the demand elasticity. This work attains a fundamental finding that the
uniform carbon tax and the cap-and-trade price are equal when the emission cap is tight. These findings
are good guidance for the environmental regulation decision makers to implement the carbon tax in the
future power systems. The first part of the dissertation does not capture the dynamics of the emissions
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and energy markets, and the small test system is not able to present the complexity of the real power
systems. Therefore, the formulation is extended to include more realistic details in the markets. Firstly,
the model is expanded to multi-period expansion planning. Secondly, the emissions can be banked for
future use or resale, which is similar to RGGI cap-and-trade programs. Thirdly, generator construction
lead-time is also considered to study the time effect to comply with the policies. We adopt the bilevel
structure in the first publication, while modifying them with three aforementioned extensions, and test
the model on a 30-bus network. Taking into account the time variable, we examined four variations
of the carbon tax policy. Some of the results are similar to the single period case. The results also
show that none of the policies is better than others under all criteria. The carbon prices or subsidies
decrease when the renewable generation increases. The first two publications serve as a preliminary
study on implementation of the carbon tax policy on the power systems. The economic impacts of the
environmental regulations are quantified via predefined comparison criteria. However, the model relies
on a strict assumption that all the market players have a full grasp of information of the power systems,
including the future decision-makings from other players. This assumption is impossible to achieve
in reality. The generation expansion decision serves as means to comply with the regulations. The
details of generation expansion planning are not well addressed, such as diversity of technology, fuel
price, and technology depreciation. The variability and intermittency of the renewable energy are not
depicted either. The profit vulnerability under uncertainty is not discussed either. In next paper, with
consideration of the aforementioned deficiencies, the focus of the study shifts its focus to generation
expansion planning under uncertainty.
The last part of the dissertation is targeting on an individual generation company and looking for
the insights of investment decision-makings under a changing environment. The third paper propose
a novel three-layer framework to assess investment candidates under uncertainty with respect to as-
sessment indicators and optimization criteria, also provide suggestions on potential improvements of
candidate plans. The bottom operations layer runs the DCOPF; the middle assessment layer not only
evaluates the investment candidates based on assessment indicators, but also gives suggestions on po-
tential plan improvement; the top optimization layer discusses the decision maker’s preferred tradeoff
criteria between risk and return in terms of expected profits and their variance, expected regret and so
on. The framework serves as a brand new toolbox for individual generation companies to pursue a
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robust and profitable long-term generation expansion plans under uncertainty. The sources of uncer-
tainty are categorized into epistemic uncertainty and aleatoric uncertainty, and we are the first to apply
different methodologies to tackle with them in the generation expansion planning problem. A realistic
case study is conducted on WECC 240-bus test system for a twenty-years planning horizon, with prac-
tical and detailed considerations of the power systems, including the temporal and spatial correlation
among the loads and renewable resource outputs under transmission network constraints, specifications
of generators, and implementations of environmental regulations. The results present useful guidance
for generation expansion planning. The evidences in the case study indicate that the carbon tax policy
could stimulate investments in renewable technology due to increasing LMPs and reducing regrets. The
investors generally benefit from the renewable generator investments in current power systems. The
results help the investors dispel doubts on the drawback of high renewable generator investment cost is
dominant rather than its low operating cost. The analysis also includes general discussion about how to
improve the existing plans by the nature of the generators and the interactions of competitors. In addi-
tion, the outcomes demonstrate the trade-offs between risk and return in terms of various optimization
criteria, and give more insightful and comprehensive information of the optimal decisions to improve
the decision robustness. The framework is not constrained by the scenario generation methodologies,
and the formulation in the operations layer is generalized to include considerations of storage, demand-
side management, the cap-and-trade policy, element outages and maintenance scheduling. However,
the framework is very time-consuming to solve and can only be applicable on predefined investment
plans. The framework makes suggestions on investment candidate improvement, but does not reassess
the modified plans. For future research, representative time intervals will be selected to represent the
whole planning horizon and save computational time. The optimization layer will modify the plans
based on the assessment layer’s feedbacks and start reevaluation process. The assessment layer will be
modeled as agent with artificial intelligence, which would be the major difficulty in the future work.
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